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ABSTRACT 
 In September 2017, Category-5 Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck the U.S. Virgin 
Islands and caused significant damage to all critical infrastructure within the territory. This 
thesis assesses the vulnerability of the fiber optic telecommunications system on the island 
of St. Croix to determine ways to ensure Internet access during future disasters. 
Specifically, we use publicly available information to (1) develop a geospatial data set for 
St. Croix Internet infrastructure, (2) generate a synthetic network model that approximates 
Internet demands and traffic by St. Croix communities and critical facilities, and (3) 
identifies network vulnerabilities to recommend disaster hardening. Results show that the 
synthetic model is vulnerable to fiber cuts that can disconnect all households and critical 
facilities from the Internet. Recommendations for system hardening include the need to 
ensure redundant physical fiber paths off-island and switching locations between internet 
service providers. 
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Executive Summary
In September 2017, Category-5 Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck the U.S. Virgin Islands
within a two-week period. This event devastated territorial infrastructure systems, including
power, water, transportation, and telecommunications. The loss of hardline fiber optic
infrastructure that provides Internet access and services impacted emergency response
operations and restricted coordination with the public. To support the territory and its
communities in future disasters, it is important to assess and reduce vulnerabilities of this
infrastructure system.
This thesis focuses on producing a representative model of the St. Croix Internet system
that enables vulnerability analysis. In particular, we:
1. gather publicly available information about the U.S. Virgin Islands Internet infras-
tructure to produce geospatial data sets for visualization and modeling;
2. develop network analysis techniques to generate a synthetic St. Croix Internet system
model that is realistic to inform its operations; and,
3. analyze the structure and characteristics of the St. Croix Internet system model to
measure how it performs under different demands and disruptions.
Our geospatial data set and model indicates that the U.S. Virgin Islands Internet includes
public and private assets across physical and virtual networks. The Virgin Islands Next
Generation Network (viNGN), a semi-autonomous government agency who provides fee-
based broadband service, owns and operates fiber optic rings across all major islands
that enable Internet connectivity within the territory and to the mainland U.S. Internet
customers, including public agencies, community organizations, schools, medical facilities,
emergency responders, and private households, purchase Internet service from commercial
internet service providers that connect to the viNGN network. Internet traffic between
public and private Internet customers is exchanged at few locations in the territory before
being sent to the mainland U.S. via submarine cables.
Synthetic Internet network generation results suggest that Internet customers are unevenly
distributed among viNGN middle mile infrastructure. Customers connect into the Internet
via Facility Access Points (FAPs). Some FAPs provide connectivity for a large amount of
xv
Internet customers while some connect relatively few. Furthermore, some FAPs connect a
larger number of medical facilities and public safety organizations than others. Ensuring
Internet access in future disasters requires hardening these critical FAPs.
St. Croix Internet demand and traffic analysis also suggests that the network is vulnerable to
fiber optic cable cuts and spikes in Internet demand. The distribution of customers across
FAPs means that the loss of key viNGN infrastructure will disconnect large portions of
public and private Internet customers. We also identify possible single points of failure,
where a single fiber cut may disconnect all Internet customers on St. Croix. Moreover, the
rated bandwidth on network bottlenecks may limit customer access during demand spikes.
Despite our model identifying significant vulnerabilities in the St. Croix Internet network,
our work is based on publicly available information which may be out of date or incomplete.
Future work should focus on validating data and modeling assumptions. Moreover, the
Internet model we assess is based on pre-hurricane infrastructure networks. Future work
should build on the data, models, and analysis presented herein to guide protection of the
post-storm system.
This analysis has considered only the system on St. Croix (STX), and as such it potentially
misses system properties that arise from the interconnections St. Thomas (STT) and St.
John (STJ). A complete analysis of the Internet infrastructure across the entire Territory
is needed to understand the resilience of the aggregate system. Moreover, because of the
distinct differences between these islands, a comparable analysis of the system on each
island also deserves attention.
xvi
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In September 2017, Category-5 Hurricanes Irma and Maria struck the United States (U.S.)
Virgin Islands (USVI) within a two-week period and collectively devastated homes, busi-
nesses, and infrastructure throughout the territory. In particular, the loss of hardline fiber
optic telecommunications infrastructure during the storms significantly impacted emer-
gency response and recovery operations (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task
Force 2018). As of April 2019, approximately 7% of the aerial fiber optic lines that enable
Internet traffic and data sharing were not restored (Virgin Islands Next Generation Net-
work 2019). The delayed recovery of fiber optic Internet systems impacted the operations
and recovery of all other lifeline infrastructure systems (e.g., electric power, water, and
transportation among others).
This thesis is in support of Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) response
and recovery activities and part of a broader FEMA-funded effort by the Naval Postgrad-
uate School (NPS) to assess and improve the resilience of interdependent USVI lifeline
infrastructure systems (Alderson et al. 2018). This thesis additionally supports several
other complementary efforts with the University of the Virgin Islands (UVI) to develop a
next-generation Hazard Mitigation and Resilience Plan for the Territory.
1.1 Overview ofCritical Infrastructure Systems in theU.S.
Virgin Islands
1.1.1 The U.S. Virgin Islands Territory
The USVI is a territory of the United States located in the Leeward Islands of the Lesser
Antilles. It is approximately 40 miles east of Puerto Rico and over 1,100 miles east of
Miami, Florida. The territory is comprised of three main islands—St. Croix (STX), St.
Thomas (STT), and St. John (STJ)—and several smaller surrounding islands. STX is the
southernmost island in the territory and geographically the largest at 82 square miles. STT
is the second largest of the islands at 32 square miles and is located 40 miles north of STX.
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The territory’s capital, Charlotte Amalie, is located on STT. STJ is the smallest of the three
islands and is located two miles east of STT. Each island is divided into community estates
with a total population of approximately 106,000 people as of the 2010 census; 50,601
across 212 estates in STX, 51,634 across 73 estates in STT, and 4,170 across 51 estates in
STJ (U.S. Census Bureau 2010a); see Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1. Population Distribution in the USVI. Source: U.S. Census
Bureau (2010b).
The territory has limited natural resources, domestic manufacturing, and agriculture. As a
result, it must import most of its energy, consumer goods, and food which creates a high
cost of living on the island. STT is the primary center for tourism, government, finance,
trade, and commerce in the territory. Its economy is largely dependent on tourism and the
cruise ship industry. The economy of STX also relies on tourism, although less so than
STT. STX is the center of other industries in the Territory including rum production at the
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Cruzan and Diageo distilleries and oil production at the Limetree Bay Terminal. Limetree
Bay (previously Hovensa refinery) was a major employer for the island prior to its closure
in 2012. Recently, it has begun the process of re-opening (Austin 2018).
1.1.2 Critical Infrastructure in the USVI
The 2001 USA PATRIOT ACT defines Critical Infrastructure (CI) as, “systems and assets,
whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or destruction
of such systems and assets would have a debilitating impact on security, national economic
security, national public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.” CI systems
span 16 sectors defined by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security to include lifeline
systems like electric power, transportation, water, telecommunications, financial services,
and healthcare among others (Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency 2020). CI
systems in the USVI are shaped by the remoteness, natural geography, and history of each
island.
This thesis focuses on assessing the operational resilience of fiber optic telecommunications
networks that provide Internet services to the USVI. For this reason, the remainder of the
thesis discusses only these systems in detail. It is important to note, however, that most CI
systems are interdependent. For example, communication systems require other CI systems
like electric power and transportation to function, and vice versa. We refer readers interested
in learning more about other CI systems in the USVI to the following studies:
• AnOperationalModel of InterdependentWater and PowerDistribution Infrastructure
Systems (Bunn 2018);
• Simulation Optimization for Operational Resilience of Interdependent Water-Power
Systems in the US Virgin Islands (Wille 2019);
• An Operational Model of Food Supply Chain and Transportation Systems in the U.S.
Virgin Islands (Good 2019);
• Analyzing Cell Phone Network Resilience in the US Virgin Islands (Wine 2020); and
• Measuring and Modeling Potable Water Demand in the United States Virgin Islands
(Borgdorff 2020).
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1.2 Internet Infrastructure Systems in the USVI
The ownership, operation, and management of the USVI telecommunication network is
spread out over a mixture of public and private stakeholders. These stakeholders often
protect or obscure information about their networks in order to ensure network security
and maintain economic competitiveness (Alderson et al. 2018). As a result, it is diffi-
cult to establish an operational understanding of how the various elements of the USVI
telecommunications landscape interact with each other to form a single network.
1.2.1 Public Communications
There are two public telecommunications providers in the USVI; the services and functions
of the Bureau of Information Technology (BIT) and the infrastructure and services of the
Virgin Islands Next Generation Network (viNGN).
Bureau of Information Technology
BIT is the government agency that responsible for the territory’s emergency communica-
tion infrastructure for first responders and for establishing, maintaining, and improving the
Information Technology (IT) environment for the Government of the USVI (USVI Hur-
ricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). Although BIT officially serves as the
information technology arm of the USVI government, other government agencies are not
required to use them and there are “no restrictions that prevent government agencies from
acquiring their own IT capabilities, technicians, application, or contractors” (Alderson et al.
2018). As a result, USVI “has been unable to establish a common acquisitions or cybersecu-
rity plan, create IT situational awareness across the government, or create IT commonality
and interoperability between agencies” (Alderson et al. 2018). In practice, BIT approves
contracts for government agencies IT requirements, runs a microwave radio network that
some government agencies use for Internet access, provides data storage services at its
STX offices, and operates the public safety public safety radio network (USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
Virgin Islands Next Generation Network
viNGN is a semi-autonomous government agency that is a wholly owned subsidiary of the
Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority (VIPFA). The agency provides a “territory-wide,
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fee-based broadband ‘middle-mile’ fiber network to private and Internet Service Providers
(ISPs), which enables the ISPs to provide broadband Internet connection services to their
customers” (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). viNGN’s middle
mile network is composed of over 220miles of terrestrial and undersea fiber optic cables and
23 Fiber Access Points (FAPs) which are buildings that connect fiber optic cable segments
and house network equipmentwhich facilitate the routing of Internet traffic (Figure 1.2 shows
the exterior of a FAP). viNGN leases capacity on commercial transcontinental submarine
cables that connect the USVI with Continental U.S. (CONUS). Additionally, viNGN
provides Internet service to all of the territory’s Community Anchor Institutions (CAIs)
which include schools, libraries, medical and healthcare providers, public safety entities,
community colleges and other institutes of higher learning, and other community support
organizations and entities (Virgin Islands Next Generation Network December 2012).
Figure 1.2. viNGN FAP on STX. Source: Virgin Islands Next Generation
Network (December 2012).
1.2.2 Private Communications
There are three primary elements of the private telecommunications system in the USVI:
ISPs, wireless service providers, and transcontinental submarine cables.
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Internet Service Providers (ISPs)
An ISP is a private company that provides Internet service to customers via wired connec-
tions. ISPs in the USVI are comprised of three types of connections: "backbone, which
is the high-capacity fiber (or trunk line) that carries massive amounts of data for local or
regional exchange, middle mile, which connect the backbone to the ISPs’ or telecommu-
nications providers’ core network or telecommunications exchange, and last mile, which
delivers the data connection to customers’ homes and businesses" (USVI Hurricane Recov-
ery and Resilience Task Force 2018, emphasis added). ISPs, in general, are secretive about
their networks, and it is difficult to determine the physical topology (i.e., where cables and
exchanges are physically located) or logical topology (i.e., how ISPs route their Internet
traffic). In the USVI, ISPs are encouraged to lease capacity on viNGN network for their
backbone and middle mile connection, though they are not required to do so (Alderson et al.
2018). As a result, ISPs may own and operate redundant infrastructure. There are multiple
ISPs operating in the USVI including Viya and Broadband VI.
Figure 1.3. Telecommunication Companies Operating in the USVI. Source:
USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018).
Wireless Service Providers
A wireless provider is a private company who provides cellular or mobile Internet service
to customers via wireless connections. The wireless network consists of communication
towers that wireless devices connect to, a microwave or fiber optic backhaul that connect
communication towers to switching stations, and switching stations that allow wireless
devices to access the Internet (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
At the time of this report, five wireless providers operate in the USVI: AT&T, PRWireless,
Viya, Verizon, and T-Mobile (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
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Like with ISPs, the lack of transparency in their operations makes it is difficult to determine
the physical and logical topology of their networks.
Transcontinental Submarine Cables
The USVI depends on transcontinental submarine cables for sending “99 percent of all data
traffic, including Internet, phone calls, and text messages, from the USVI to the rest of the
world” (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). The USVI’s location
in the Leeward Islands makes a strategic connection point for 11 submarine cables that
service the Caribbean and Americas (Telegeography 2020). ISPs and viNGN must lease
capacity on these cables in order to use them.
Figure 1.4. Submarine Cables in the Leeward Islands. Source: Telegeography
(2020).
1.2.3 The Origins of USVI’s Internet Infrastructure
In 2009, the VIPFA submitted for and received five grants from the National Telecom-
munication and Information Administration (NTIA) under the Broadband Technology Op-
portunities Program (BTOP) and State Broadband Initiative programs to improve telecom-
munication infrastructure and services on the island. The most significant of these grants
were the $1.29M State Broadband Data and Development Program (Virgin Islands Public
Finance Authority 2009c), the $58.89M viNGN Comprehensive Community Infrastructure
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Program (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a), and the $3.02M viNGN Public
Computer Center Program (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009b).
The State Broadband Data and Development Program focused on gathering, verifying, and
disseminating information about broadband services in the USVI (Virgin Islands Public
Finance Authority 2009c). This information was used for evaluating broadband needs, for
expansion and capacity planning, and as a cost analysis tool for building the infrastructure
throughout the territory. Although much of this data is kept confidential under Notice of
Funding Availability (NOFA) requirements and Non-Disclosure Agreement (NDA), several
geospatial files presumably produced under this grant are available on the NTIA website.
Of particular use is a geospatial file of 316 CAIs and their maximum upload and download
bandwidth (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009c).
Figure 1.5. Map of CAIs in USVI. Source: Virgin Islands Public Finance
Authority (2009c).
The Comprehensive Community Infrastructure Program proposed to deploy a viNGN-
owned and operated middle mile fiber optic infrastructure throughout the territory (Virgin
Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a). The proposed middle mile network consists of
3,000miles of existing fiber optic cable and 244miles of new construction to offer broadband
speeds between 10Megabits Per Second (Mbps) and 10 Gigabits Per Second (Gbps) to CAIs
8
and local ISPs. The project application, quarterly and annual progress reports, and fact sheet
provide insight into the physical and logical topology of the USVI Internet including cable
landing sites, Internet exchanges, existing and proposed fiber optic infrastructure, viNGN
FAPs, and the names and locations of 325 proposed CAIs. This project was completed in
the second quarter of 2014.
Figure 1.6. Proposed viNGN Middle Mile Network Diagram. Source: Virgin
Islands Public Finance Authority (2009a).
The viNGN Public Computer Centers Program proposed to “deploy as many as 740 new
workstations in over 40 new and five upgraded computer centers, increasing public access
to computer centers by up to 1,500 hours per week and accommodating approximately
13,000 additional users each week” (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009b). A
comparison between the list of Public Computing Center (PCC) and CIAs reveals that PCCs
are included in the CIA list. This project was completed in the second quarter of 2014.
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Figure 1.7. St. Andrews PCC in Charlotte Amalie. Source: USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force (2018).
1.3 Vulnerabilities in USVI Internet Infrastructure
The USVI’s Internet system has proven to be vulnerable to both natural and human events.
Hurricanes Irma and Maria collectively devastated the territory’s telecommunications in-
frastructure which produced Internet outages lasting several months. More recently, Internet
service has been disrupted in the USVI by the accidental cutting of fiber optic cables.
1.3.1 Hurricanes Irma and Maria
Both public and private telecommunication networks “sustained significant damage in
Hurricanes Irma and Maria which, in many cases, resulted in systems being out of service
for several months” (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). Ninety
percent of viNGN’s aerial cable infrastructure was destroyed or rendered unusable and two
FAPs suffered structural and water damage. ISPs also suffered significant damage to their
last mile aerial cables which, combined with the losses to viNGN’s network, prevented
customers on both wired and wireless devices from accessing the Internet (USVI Hurricane
Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018). There was approximately a 60%-to-70% drop
off in Internet traffic on the territory immediately following the storms. Both viNGN’s
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buried cable infrastructure and the territory’s submarine cables were largely unaffected by
the storms directly but were impacted by recovery operations.
Figure 1.8. Hurricane Maria Damage on STX. Source: Reuters (2017).
Damage sustained by the territory’s hardline telecommunication infrastructure significantly
impacted emergency response and recovery operations. Government agencies were severely
restricted in their ability to coordinate with each other, access the Internet to provide updates
and receive information, or pass critical information to citizens. The lack of Internet also
impacted the public’s ability to contact emergency response services or provide updates to
friends and family (USVI Hurricane Recovery and Resilience Task Force 2018).
1.3.2 Recent Internet Disruptions
Internet service in theUSVI continues to be disrupted due to vulnerabilities in the Territory’s
Internet infrastructure. In September 2019, Viya, a ISP in the Territory, reported an Internet
service interruption on STT when a USVI Department of Public Works (DPW) contractor
severed an underground fiber optic cable (Viya 2019). In February 2020, AT&T accidentally
cut viNGN cables on STT interrupting service to STJ (Lee 2020).
Incidents such as these highlight two important vulnerabilities in the USVI Internet In-
frastructure. First, although viNGN provides a middle mile network for ISPs to connect
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through, they are not required to use it. As a result, there are multiple public and private ser-
vice providers that overlap throughout the territory. Stephens Adams, the Chief Executive
Officer of viNGN, noted that “on St. Thomas the overlap is greater than 70 percent and on
St. Croix it more than 80 percent” (Lee 2020). Second, “Call Before You Dig” legislation,
which was passed in 2015 and is designed to prevent accidental cable cuts, has never been
fully implemented (Lee 2020).
1.4 Thesis Goals
The goal of this study is to produce a representative model of the USVI fiber optic infras-
tructure that will allow us to conduct analysis at the operational level. In order to establish
an operational view of the USVI telecommunications infrastructure, we first collect and
curate data on the known parts of the network. This includes gathering information on
infrastructure that can visibly be observed using tools developed by the NPS Computer
Science Department (Woodman 2016), information that is available in the public domain,
and information that public and private entities share with us. Data is curated into geospatial
data sets for modeling and analysis using the open-source QuantumGeographic Information
System (QGIS) (QGIS Development Team 2019).
Once portions of the telecommunications infrastructure are determined, we fill in the
gaps through synthetic network generation techniques to infer a network that represents
actual USVI Internet infrastructure. Then, we identify vulnerabilities, critical points in the
network, opportunities for improvement, and efforts to prioritize.
Ultimately, this study makes several contributions.
• A new, curated geospatial data set is created that aggregates publicly available and
proprietary telecommunications infrastructure data into a single repository for mod-
eling and analysis.
• A working synthetic network generation model is created in Pyomo that serves USVI
communities and generates Internet network maps that are realistic, but not real.
• Network and vulnerability analysis methods are implemented and presented in a way
that serves USVI stakeholder needs.




Significant research has aimed to improve our understanding of the Internet’s complex
structure and the associated Internet infrastructure system found in the USVI. In general,
researchers develop frameworks for analyzing and improving Internet architectures to be
more resilient (i.e., continue to function before, during, and after large-scale and surprising
disruptions). More specifically, a number of technical methods developed in the literature
inform the data curation, modeling, and analysis completed in this thesis. These methods
include:
• Synthetic network topology generation to produce realistic Internet infrastructure
systems for robustness and failure assessment;
• Internet traffic models that consider the structure, function, and relationships across
layers to deliver traffic in a realistic way; and,
• Internet behavior models that capture how network routing and congestion change as
infrastructure fails and disaster challenge system operations.
We review the most relevant of each in turn.
2.1 Structure of the Internet
An important starting point is to understand what the Internet is and how it works. The
Internet is a global network of interconnected computer networks that communicate with
each other through layered protocols. The Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model of
Internet layers is “widely accepted as a basis for the understanding of how a network protocol
stack should operate and as a reference tool for comparing network stack implementation”
(Murhammer et al. 1998).
In the OSImodel, “each layer provides a set of functions to the layer above and, in turn, relies
on the functions provided by the layer below” (Murhammer et al. 1998). Figure 2.1 provides
a simple depiction of the OSI model where two Internet devices, called hosts, exchange
information through layers. The lowest layer is the physical layer which provides physical
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Figure 2.1. The OSI Model of Internet Layers. The OSI model provides a
framework for understanding how devices, called hosts, communicate with
each other through the layered Internet connections. Adapted from Murham-
mer et al. (1998).
pathways, such as network interfaces, cables, and hardware devices; over which raw bits
of information travel. The second layer is the data link layer. This layer creates frames of
data and provides error checking. Most switches, hardware devices which forward Internet
traffic from one host to another, operate at the data link layer. The third layer is the network
layer. This layer forms packets of information and decides which physical pathway those
packets will take through routers. The fourth layer is the transport layer which establishes
host-to-host connections. Layers 5, 6, and 7 are primarily concerned with how those hosts
communicate with each other.
2.2 Internet Systems and Resilience
The Internet is itself a critical component of modern society that governments, businesses,
and private citizens rely on to communicate. Additionally, many other CI sectors—such as
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energy, transportation, and potable water—rely on Internet-connected Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems for monitoring and control. Disruptions to Internet
service have potentially catastrophic public safety, economic, and social consequences. It
is critical, then, that Internet systems are designed to be survivable and resilient (Sterbenz
et al. 2013). Sterbenz et al. (2013) define resilience as “the ability of the network to provide
desired service even when challenged by attacks, large-scale disasters, and other failures.”
The principles of redundancy and diversity facilitate resilient Internet design and engineer-
ing (Sterbenz et al. 2013; Çetinkaya et al. 2012; Rohrer et al. 2014). Redundancy is the the
replication of elements within a network to provide fault tolerance (Sterbenz et al. 2013).
For example, a resilient network may have multiple cables connecting two Internet nodes
or multiple servers available in case of disruption. If a single element is compromised,
there are other elements available to ensure reliable operation. Diversity is providing alter-
native means to provide reliable function (Sterbenz et al. 2013). Geographic diversity is a
critical component to ensure a resilient physical network; separating key network elements
by distance decrease their chances of all being affected by the same event (Çetinkaya et al.
2012). Rohrer et al. (2014) demonstrates that path diversification can accurately predict the
survivability of Internet topologies.
2.3 Synthetic Internet Topology Generation
There are at least two classes of methods researchers use to generate Internet network
topology to estimate the structure and function of the built infrastructure system:
1. Complex Networks: Network topology generated using complex networks focus on
using the statistical and graph properties of Internet systems to produce typologies
that share similar characteristics.
2. Optimization: Network topology generated with optimization uses more engineering
and real-world constraints on physical network structure to generate realistic networks
that mimic the decisions made by owners and operators during initial infrastructure
construction.
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2.3.1 Synthetic Internet Topologies based on Complex Networks
Significant research has been conducted into generating Internet topologies by modeling the
graphical properties of a network. Traditionally, these models were based on network nodes
randomly linked together, which ignores economic and policy considerations that guide
ISPs when they are designing their networks (Jabbar et al. 2008). As a result, networks
produced by random graphs do not adequately represent the actual system.
Jabbar et al. (2008) proposed to incorporate location and cost parameters into existing
topology generators which allow for more realistic analysis. Pure random models are the
most basic form. In these models, pairs of nodes are connected with an independent
probability. The locality model and Waxman model are more complex and connect pairs of
nodes based on the distance between them (Jabbar et al. 2008). In the locality model, pairs
of nodes are connected with a probability based on whether the distance between the nodes
is above or below a certain threshold. In the Waxman model, modes are connected with a
probability that takes into account the distance between the nodes, the maximum distance
between any pair of nodes, and the ratio between the shortest and longest link. TheWaxman
model produces realistic topologies that are more representative of the actual systems than
random graphs (Jabbar et al. 2008).
2.3.2 Synthetic Internet Topologies based on Optimization
Alderson et al. (2006) propose that “Internet topology at the router-level can be understood
in terms of the tradeoffs between network performance and the technological and economic
factors constraining design” through optimization. Some of the principle divers of network
topology are the following.
• Link costs. The installation, operation, and maintenance of communication links are
extremely expensive and cost tends to increase with the length of the link. As a result,
network designers are economically motivated minimize the number of long distance
links by aggregating traffic.
• Router technology. Routers are networking devices that forward packets of data
between parts of an Internet network. Routers have a maximum number of link con-
nections and maximum bandwidth which creates an “ ‘efficient frontier’ of possible
bandwidth-degree combinations available for each router” (Alderson et al. 2006).
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Network designers are economically motivated to employ routers as close to the
‘efficient frontier’ as possible in order to gain the most efficiency out of their network.
• Customer constraints. Internet customers themselves drive many features of Internet
networks. The concentration of Internet customers and the bandwidth that they are
willing to pay for will inform the type of Internet infrastructure that network designers
will install at certain locations.
• Service requirements. In order to be commercially viable, Internet networks must
deliver quality network performance which this paper defines as the maximum pro-
portional throughout of a network under heavy traffic. In other words, an Internet
topology must support its customer’s requirements.
Derosier (2008) utilized optimization-based reverse engineering to produce router-level
topologies that capture the technical capabilities, economic constraints, operational re-
quirements, and performance objectives faced by real ISPs (Derosier 2008). First, he
analyzed existing router-level topology for Tier-1 ISPs and reversed engineered their key
design principles. These principles include the types of routers that are typically located at
Internet nodes and the types of links between Internet nodes.
Next, Derosier (2008) forward-engineered a network topology generation process based on
his observed design principles. This process takes the population and the penetration of
Internet users in the market to determine the number of Internet customers at a location
and the number of access routers required to support them. He then uses that information
to determine the number of backbone routers required and the number and location of
backbone links between nodes.
Derosier (2008) provides amethodology to generate ‘realistic, yet fictitious’ network topolo-
gies that adhere to basic technological and economic constraints faced by real network
designers. Perhaps most importantly, these networks are generated from readily available
data such as population and geographic information.
2.4 Modeling Internet Traffic Demands
Crain (2012) andMartin (2014) both used gravity models to estimate Internet traffic demand
between geographically distinct locations in order to model telecommunication networks.
Gravity models are based on Newton’s law of gravitation which states that objects are
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attracted to each other with a force proportional to their mass and inversely proportional to
the distances between them squared. Gravity models can be applied to telecommunication
networks by using population, number of Internet hosts, or Internet traffic entering or exiting
a node, or the total traffic in a network as surrogates for mass and distance. The output of a
gravity model is a traffic matrix which shows the amount of Internet traffic entering a node
and the amount of Internet traffic exiting the node destine for other nodes in the network.
Here, we repeat the formulation of Crain (2012), who used a gravity model to approximate
Internet traffic between countries through submarine cables. The trafficmatrix is built using
the estimated total traffic across the total network T tot and the number of Internet hosts Hn
in each country.
Index use
n ∈ N Countries (alias s, t )
Data [units]
T tot Total traffic across the network [Gbps]
Ts Total traffic associated with country s [Gbps]
Tst Total traffic exchanged between country s and country t [Gbps]
bts Traffic from country s to country t [Gbps]













Tst ∀s, t ∈ N, s , t
btt = −
∑
s:s,t bts ∀t ∈ N
Martin (2014) used a gravity model to develop an Internet traffic matrix for the fictional
country of Dystopia. Dystopia is fictional country used for modeling disaster situations and
does not have a T tot or Ts built in. Martin (2014) estimated the population around Internet
nodes, the penetration of Internet into that node, and the estimated daily use of Internet by
use which is formulated as
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Daily_Traffic(n) = Population(n) × Penetration(n) × Daily_Use(n).
Once the daily traffic at each node was determined, Martin (2014) multiplied the daily traffic
for each node by every other node’s traffic demand to produce a traffic matrix.
2.5 Modeling Internet Behavior
Alderson et al. (2015) describe a method for assessing the operational resilience of CI
systems using Attacker-Defender Models (Alderson et al. 2015). The system is first viewed
from the operator’s perspective. The operator may be a human, automated system, or a
combination of the two that makes decisions about the behavior of the system in order
maximize objectives while minimizing expenses subject to constraints. In this context, the
system’s objectives are what the operator wants the system to do (e.g., minimize the cost
of moving a commodity through a system). The systems constraints are what it can do
(e.g., each arc can only move a certain amount of the commodity). Alderson et al. (2015)




where x̂ is a vector that represents the state of the system, the setY (x̂) represents the possible
actions the operator can take given the state x̂, and f (x̂,y) is a function that measures the
performance of action y (Alderson et al. 2015). This produces a baseline solution to the
Operator Model.
The system is then viewed from the attacker’s perspective. Attacker in this sense represents
any source of disruption to the system whether it be natural (i.e., hurricanes) or man-made
(i.e., terrorism). Alderson et al. present an example where an attacker has the ability to
target a single link in the system which will maximize the costs incurred by the operator.







where x now represents a decision variable belonging to the attacker and X represents the
set of possible actions the attacker can take. The operator still faces the same minimization
function as before but the state parameter x̂ has become a decision variable for the attackers.
This form of optimization is an Attacker-Defender Model. Brown et al. (2006) and Alderson
et al. (2013) apply Attacker-Defender Model to defending critical infrastructure defense.
2.6 Our Contribution
This thesis produces a synthetic network topology of the USVI’s Internet infrastructure that
embodies the functions of the actual system. This is accomplished by curating publicly
available data about the USVI’s Internet infrastructure into geospatial data sets in QGIS to
produce a graph of the network. We apply graph theory topological generation methods
found in Sterbenz et al. (2013) and Rohrer et al. (2014) to produce sets of node pairs that
describe how the Internet functions and utilize optimization methods identified by Alderson
et al. (2006) and Derosier (2008) to analyze its performance. Finally, we conduct ‘what if’
style analysis on the network to study how the network performs against disruptions.
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CHAPTER 3:
Data Curation and Model Development
We generate a synthetic model of the USVI Internet infrastructure with methods for data
creation and development, network generation, and multilayer network analysis. Together,
these methods enable network traffic assignment and vulnerability assessment.
3.1 Data Curation
We curate publicly available information about the USVI telecommunications infrastructure
and develop geospatial data sets that capture the physical location and other key attributes of
Internet infrastructure. The USVI Internet is comprised of several related network compo-
nent types which are organized into layers to transport data to and from network customers.
Traffic is generated by Internet customers who purchase Internet access from commercial
ISPs to upload or download data. Last mile Internet connections connect Internet customers
to middle mile fiber optic infrastructure. The middle mile network achieves global connec-
tivity through backbone connections to Network Access Points (NAPs) in the continental
United States. We develop geospatial data sets for each node and edge that comprise these
interrelated layers.
3.1.1 Internet Customers
Internet customers in the USVI are divided into two categories; private Internet customers
and public Internet customers.
Private Internet Customers
Private Internet customers are households that purchase Internet access from an ISP. Infor-
mation for private Internet customers within the USVI was derived from previous work on
supply chain modeling in the USVI (Good 2019). The USVI tracks census information by
estates which are smaller than traditional census sub-districts but serve the same purpose.
Good (2019) created population nodes for STX by dividing the island’s 212 estates into a
geospatial file containing 233 nodes located along surface streets. Figure 3.1 provides a
visual depiction of these nodes representing private Internet customers on STX.
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Figure 3.1. St. Croix Private Internet Customers. There are 233 nodes
on STX, depicted as red circles, representing population centers in estates.
Each population node represents a group of private Internet customers and
is annotated with attribute information such as the population and number
of households.
Public Internet Customers
Public Internet customers include both CAIs and PCCs. The viNGN website maintains
a list of 25 PCCs which are currently in operation, and VIPFA’s final progress report
for the viNGN Comprehensive Community Infrastructure Program identifies 316 CAIs that
successfully connected to the network and (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a).
A comparison between the PCC and CAI lists determined that all PCCs are located at CAIs.
A geospatial file containing all territorial CAIs was obtained from the State BroadbandData
and Development Program documents (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009c).
The file coded CAIs with one of seven category codes relating the facility to its purpose to
the USVI government (see Table 3.1). The file was imported into QGIS, split by zip code,
and then re-compiled into three separate layers, one for each of the USVI main islands.
Several of the CAIs contained inaccurate zip codes and Global Positioning System (GPS)
coordinates which required updating. Figure 3.2 provides a visual depiction of CAI nodes
on STX.
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5 University, College, other Post Secondary School
6 Other Community Support— Governmental
7 Other Community Support— Non-Governmental
Figure 3.2. St. Croix Public Internet customers. STX has 133 CAIs, de-
picted as red circles. We annotate each CAI node with attribute information
including type and maximum upload and download data rate.
3.1.2 Last Mile Infrastructure
Lastmile infrastructure consists of ISP or viNGNfiber optic cableswhich connect public and
private Internet customers to FAPs on the middle mile network. Fiber optic infrastructure
tends to follow roads because they provide an inexpensive right-of-way where cables can
be hung on utility poles or buried (Çetinkaya et al. 2015). The transportation network
developed in Good (2019) was adopted to represent possible last mile Internet infrastructure
segments. First, we found the closest node on the transportation network to each CAI using
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a distance matrix in QGIS and then generated arcs connecting those CAIs to their closest
transportation node. Next, FAPs were connected to the transportation network using the
same process. Finally, the start and end point of each segment were added to it’s attribute
table. This method provided a geospatial representation of possible last mile infrastructure
segments with their source and and destination. Figure 3.3 provides a visual depiction of
STX’s last mile infrastructure.
Figure 3.3. St. Croix Last Mile Infrastructure. Black lines represent fiber
optic cables, red circles represent public and private Internet customers, and
green circles represent FAPs.
3.1.3 Middle Mile Infrastructure
The middle mile is the core of the viNGN open service network. It consists of FAPs
interconnected by rings of fiber optic cable owned and operated by viNGN. These cables
include aerial and buried conduit on each island and submarine cables which connect STX,
STT, and STJ.
Facility Access Points
Available information suggests that 23 FAPs were constructed at various locations along
the middle mile (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a; Virgin Islands Next Gen-
eration Network December 2012). The locations and presence of these FAPs have all been
verified by faculty, staff, or student site visits. Two FAPs, STX-02 in Frederiksted on STX
and STT-01 at the Virgin Islands Territorial Emergency Management Agency (VITEMA)
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headquarters on STT, are designated as “Super FAPs” which contain the infrastructure to
power the viNGN submarine cables between islands. Figure 3.4 provides a visual depiction
of each FAP on STX.
Figure 3.4. St. Croix Facility Access Point Locations. There are 11 FAPs
on STX, represented as green circles, that connect Internet customers to
middle mile fiber optic cables. FAP STX-02, located on the west coast of
STX, is a Super FAP that contains the infrastructure to power the viNGN
submarine cables between the islands.
Terrestrial Fiber Optic Cables
viNGN’s terrestrial fiber optic cables physically connect FAPs to each other. Available
evidence suggests that there is over 3,000miles of fiber optic cable in the viNGNmiddlemile
(Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a; Virgin Islands Next Generation Network
December 2012). Fiber optic cables are either buried, mounted on wood poles, or mounted
on composite poles. Different segments of fiber optic cable connect to each other through
junctions. Figure 3.5 provides a visual depiction of the terrestrial fiber optic cables on STX
colored by type. A similar ring exists on STT connecting to STJ.
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Figure 3.5. St. Croix Terrestrial Middle Mile Fiber Optic Cables. Middle
mile terrestrial fiber optic cables connect FAPs across STX. Buried cables
are represented as green lines, wood pole cables as orange lines, composite
poles as blue lines, and FAPs as green circles. Cable junctions are omitted
for clarity.
Submarine Fiber Optic Cables
viNGN’s submarine fiber optic cables physically connect the middle mile fiber optic rings
on STX, STT, STJ to each other. Applications for the submarine cable landing permits filed
in 2012 show the locations of the cable landing sites on Western and Eastern sides of STX
and STT with dual connections between STT and STJ.
Figure 3.6 depicts the viNGN submarine cable system as planned in original public doc-
uments. However, conversations with USVI telecommunication stakeholders suggest only
portions of this cable system were installed and/or are currently in use (Federal Commu-
nications Commission 2012). Specifically, stakeholders suggest that the cables connecting
western and eastern STX and eastern STX to the eastern STT are either not installed or are
not in use.
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Figure 3.6. USVI Internet Exchange Points, Submarine Middle Mile, and
Global Connectivity. Internet traffic is sent by middle mile cables to Internet
Exchange Points (IXPs) on STX and STT, then underwater to NAPs for
global connectivity. viNGN submarine middle mile submarine cables are rep-
resented as black lines, underground cables as green, aerial cables on wooden
poles as orange, and aerial cables on composite poles are blue. IXPs are rep-
resented as blue circles. Backbone connections to the continental U.S. are
represented as red lines, with Florida and New York NAPs located off the
map to the west.
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Local Internet Exchange Points (IXPs)
The final component of the viNGN middle mile network are IXPs. IXPs are co-location
facilities where intra-territory Internet traffic is exchanged between different ISPs. They
receive Internet traffic from Super FAPs through the territory’s middle mile infrastructure.
There are two IXPs in the USVI: one at the Global Crossing Center on STX located
near the Frederiksted Super FAP and at the AT&T co-location center on STT near the
VITEMA Super FAP (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a). Unless the source
and destination are both within the same on-island ISP, all Internet traffic in the USVI must
run through an IXP before it reaches its intended recipient.
3.1.4 Backbone Connection and Global Connectivity
The USVI telecommunication backbone connects to the rest of the world via submarine
cables (Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a). viNGN leases dark fibers on the
cable system operated by Mid-Atlantic Crossing (formerly Global Crossing); this system
connects STX to Florida and to New York via two separate physical submarine conduits at
10 Gbps each. On the mainland, viNGN leases space at NAPs in Florida and New York
(Virgin Islands Public Finance Authority 2009a). Like IXPs, NAPs are facilities where ISP
exchange Internet traffic. USVI Internet customers access the global Internet through the
Florida and New York NAPs.
3.2 A Network Model of the Internet
We develop methods to represent the Internet as a multi-layer network where individual
network layers provide distinct networking services by creating physical and virtual connec-
tions. Throughout this work, we model the Internet as a multilayer directed graph G(N,E),
where n ∈ N are the nodes in the Internet and (s, d, l) ∈ E are edge-tuples representing the
source-destination pair (s, d) of nodes and the associated network layer (l). Internet nodes
exist at all layers, but may not operate at all layers. In contrast, edges only exist at a single
layer. Edges at all layers are assumed to be bidirectional and full-duplex, but are modelled
as directed arcs with upload and download traffic non-interfering.
Our methods focus on the first four layers of the OSI Internet model (i.e., l ∈ {1,2,3,4}).
Each Internet node and network layer provides distinct functionality for system operation.
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3.2.1 Model Primitives for OSI Layers 1-4
Layer 1 (l = 1) is comprised of fiber runs connected at network junctions. A fiber run refers
to the real-world fiber optic cable that comprises the physical backbone of the Internet.
When a fiber run is installed, it is typically in semi-rigid tubing called conduit containing
large bundles (e.g., 288 fibers in a typical underground conduit in the USVI). The fibers in
a conduit may “share fate,” in the sense that if dug up by a backhoe one expects them all to
be severed. Long runs may require optical repeaters, which use electricity to amplify the
optical signal. Changing the curvature of a fiber (e.g., when an aerial cable swings in the
wind) will change the ability of the fiber to transmit light, possibly resulting in lost data.
Layer 2 (l = 2) is comprised of links that connect network switches. A link is comprised of
one or more layer-1 fiber runs. A link is available if and only if all of its underlying fiber
runs and junctions are available. The link transmits frames which include error detection.
Layer 3 (l = 3) is comprised of segments that connect network routers and/or hosts. Hosts
are the physical endpoints of the Internet (e.g., computers, servers) that are used to run
applications. A segment at layer 3 is comprised of one or more layer-2 links. The segment
is fully available as long as the layer-2 graph is connected. Alternatively, the segment is
fully available as long as the layer-2 graph is not partitioned. A segment on the Internet is
reachable from the rest of the Internet via advertised routes. The global Internet advertises
approximately 0.5 million routed segments.
Layer 4 (l = 4) is comprised of traffic flows between hosts. Applications (running on hosts)
are the logical endpoints of the Internet, which generate and consume network traffic. Flows
at layer 4 traverse one or more segments at layer 3. Hosts connect using flows to upload and
download data. Uploading and downloading occurs at different rates.
A Simple Model of the USVI Internet
Figure 3.7 provides a depiction of a simplified multi-layer Internet network consistent with
the system in the USVI. In Figure 3.7, nodes are represented as grey boxes and given names
of real locations and infrastructure types found in the USVI. Colored circles represent the
layers of the OSI model at which the nodes operate.
Colored lines in Figure 3.7 represent edges between nodes at different OSI layers. The black
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Figure 3.7. Simple Model of the USVI Internet System. Grey rectangles
represent nodes that connect physical infrastructure together. There are
four node types: junction, switch, router, and host; these are indicated
by the colored circles representing the layer at which each node operates.
Colored lines represent the connectivity (network edges) between layers of
the OSI model. There are four edge types: layer-1 runs (black), layer-2
links (green), layer-3 segments (blue), and layer-4 flows (red). All nodes
operate in physical layer (black). However, each node does not take part in
all OSI Internet layers. Nodes that do not operate at higher layers in the
stack act as pass-through nodes and are ignored during analysis of that layer.
For example, CAI and FAP 2 nodes operate at layer 2 and may have a link
connecting them. All nodes between them that do not operate at layer 2
(i.e., ‘j1’) act as pass-through for this link.
edges are layer-1 runs between nodes. Every node in the simple model has a physical run
to at least one other node represented in the real world as a fiber optic cable. Every node
exists in layer 1 and may operate at higher layers within the Internet. Every node operates
at all layers under its highest level (e.g., a node that operates at layer 4 must also operate at
layer 3, layer 2, and layer 1).
The green edges are layer-2 links between nodes. Some junctions do not provide switching
operations and are pass-through nodes in layer 2. For example, consider the layer-2 link
between ‘stt_stj’ and ‘fap1’ on the bottom left of Figure 3.7. The link runs through an
intermediate junction, ‘fred_south’, even though ‘fred_south’ does not operate at layer 2.
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This is because the layer-2 link physically runs over ‘fred_south’ but the link logically does
not recognize the node.
Blue edges are layer-3 segments between routers and red edges are layer-4 flows between
hosts. Unlike layer 2, only a single link-path must be available to connect routers along a
layer-3 segment. Similarly, only a single segment-path must be available to connect layer-4
hosts.
3.2.2 Internet Node Attributes
Table 3.2 defines node attributes that capture the function of actual Internet infrastructure
and enable network modeling. In general, all nodes in the network graph G are given a
unique ID labeled with the OSI layers in which it operates (as a Boolean). Junctions and
routers provide no additional service to the network and do not require specialized attributes.
We assign additional attributes depending on whether the node is a switch or a host.
Every switch node has an uplinks attribute which provides a prioritized layer-2 link that the
switch will use for transmitting Internet traffic. In general, a network switch only uses a
single uplink at a time, but has multiple uplinks it can choose from for transmitting traffic.
Network traffic results from a combination of flows moving between hosts in both the
upload and download direction. We estimate the aggregate traffic flows using average and
peak demand measures. We also add additional attributes used for demand calculation and
future analyses. These include population at a node, whether the node requires electricity
to operate, and whether the node is available for network operation (e.g., during a disaster).
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Table 3.2. Internet Node Attributes
Attribute Description
Node ID (string) A unique identifier for each node.
Node Type (integer) Value (1-8) assigned based on the physical services
the node provides. Each node is only one type.
is_layer1 (boolean) ‘True’ if node operates in layer 1 (junction),
‘False’ otherwise.
is_layer2 (boolean) ‘True’ value if node operates in layer 2 (switch),
‘False’ otherwise.
is_layer3 (boolean) ‘True’ value if node operates in layer 3 (router),
‘False’ otherwise.
is_layer4 (boolean) ‘True’ value if node operates in layer 4 (host),
‘False’ otherwise.
Population (integer) The number of people that reside at that node,
0 if not population center.
Average Demand (float) If host node, calculated average Internet demand in Gbps.
Peak Demand (float) If host node, calculated peak Internet demand in Gbps.
Requires Power (boolean) ‘True’ if node requires power to operate, ‘False’ otherwise.
Backup Power (integer) If node requires power, the number of hours
the node can operate without electricity, 0 otherwise.
Uplinks If node is a switch, a prioritized list of links the
(list of dictionaries) node can connect with in OSI layer 2, Null otherwise
Available? (boolean) ‘True’ if node is installed and operating, ‘False’ otherwise.
False values apply to proposed equipment never installed
and non-functional installed equipment.
Geometry (string) A formatted geometry string for geospatial representation.
Simple Model Node Attributes
We develop methods to assign node attributes for the USVI Internet model based on
Table 3.2. We demonstrate these methods for the simple network in Figure 3.7. Figure
3.8 visually presents these nodes. Each node is assigned 14 attributes based on realistic
function and characteristics that junctions, switches, routers, and hosts have in the USVI.
Several node attributes are assigned and calculated based on USVI data. First, each nodes
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is assigned one of the following node types based on the primary functions completed by
the node when operating in the USVI Internet: (Type 1) Population Node, (Type 2) CAI
Node, (Type 3) FAP Node, (Type 4) Super FAP Node, (Type 5) Junction Node, (Type 6)
IXP Node, (Type 7) Submarine Cable Landing Site, (Type 8) NAP node.
Figure 3.8. Node Types for Simple Model. The color of each node corre-
sponds to the highest level of the OSI model at which each node operates.
Black nodes are junction nodes, green nodes are switch nodes, blue nodes
are router nodes, and red nodes are host nodes.
Then, we calculate demands for host nodes that drive Internet traffic. Specifically, we
calculate demand at population nodes (Type 1) as:
avg_demandp = Populationp × avg_usep ∀p ∈ N (3.1)
peak_demandp = Populationp × peak_usep ∀p ∈ N (3.2)
where p ∈ N is a Type-1 population node. We assume avg_usep = 0.001 Gbps and
peak_usep = 0.005 Gbps for STX communities.
We calculate demands for CAI nodes (Type 2) as:
avg_demandc = 1 Gbps (3.3)
peak_demandc = 10 Gbps (3.4)
where c ∈ N is a Type-2 CAI node.
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Finally, we assign uplinks for layer-2 nodes to determine prioritized layer-2 links that the
node will use when sending Internet traffic. Uplinks are manually added to layer-2 nodes.
Each uplink is given a priority, where hosts are assigned a single, primary uplink and FAPs
and IXPs are given primary and alternate uplinks. This method captures the redundant
routing options within the middle mile infrastructure and the operational fact that uplink
routes are generally assigned by hand for FAPs. Table 3.3 provides the node type and layer
attributes, Table 3.4 provides the average and peak demand of population and CAI nodes,
and Table 3.5 provides the uplinks.
Table 3.3. Simple Model Node Type and Layer Attributes
Node ID node_type is_layer1 is_layer2 is_layer3 is_layer4
fap1 4 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE
fap3 3 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE
fap2 3 TRUE TRUE FALSE FALSE
ip_exchange 6 TRUE TRUE TRUE FALSE
j1 5 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
fred_north 7 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
fred_south 7 TRUE FALSE FALSE FALSE
estate 1 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
stt_stj 1 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
conus 1 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
community_anchor_institution 2 TRUE TRUE TRUE TRUE
Table 3.4. Simple Model Population and CAI Node Demand Attributes






Table 3.5. Simple Model Node Uplink Attributes












3.2.3 Internet Edge Attributes
Once the nodes have been established, we build edges for layer 1, layer 2, layer 3, and layer
4 as four separate files in QGIS. We assign each edge nine attributes to integrate each edge
into a single master edge list. Edge attributes are presented in Table 3.6.
We assign several edge attributes for network analysis based on edge type. All edges share
some similar attributes. Whereas nodes can operate at multiple OSI layers simultaneously,
each edge operates only at a single layer. We assign an integer value representing the layer
(1-4) for the edge. We also assign a boolean variable representing whether the edge is
available or unavailable and a geometry string for geospatial representation.
Some attributes are layer-specific. For layer-1 edges, we assign the medium and type,
primarily for future analysis that considers edge materials and physical orientation.
For layer-2 edges, we assign the bandwidth provided for network traffic. We calculate
provided bandwidth differently depending on the source and destination of the edge. We
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Table 3.6. Internet Edge Attributes
Parameter Description
Source (string) ID of source node.
Destination (string) ID of destination node.
Layer (integer) The OSI layer of the edge.
Component Arcs (list) If layer 2 edge, list of layer 1 runs
associated with the link. Null otherwise.
Medium (integer) Transmission medium
(e.g., 1: fiber optic, 2: coaxial, etc.)
Type (integer) If layer 1 edge, physical orientation
(e.g., 1: wood pole, 2: composite pole, etc.)
Provided Bandwidth If layer 2 edge, bandwidth available for Internet traffic.
(integer)
Available? (boolean) ‘True’ if edge installed and operating,
False, otherwise.
Geometry (string) Formatted string for geospatial representation.
calculate provided bandwidth for edges from population nodes to FAP as:
provided_bandwidthp, f = Populationp × host_uploadp ∀p ∈ N (3.5)
provided_bandwidth f ,p = Populationp × host_downloadp ∀p ∈ N (3.6)
where p ∈ N are population nodes and f ∈ N are FAP nodes. Populationp is the population
at p, host_uploadp is the advertised upload speed of a residential Internet connection (1
Gbps) at p, and host_downloadp is the advertised download speed of a residential Internet
connection (5 Gbps) at node p.
The provided bandwidth for edges from CAI nodes to FAP nodes are calculated as:
provided_bandwidthc, f = cai_uploadc ∀c ∈ N (3.7)
provided_bandwidth f ,c = cai_downloadc ∀c ∈ N (3.8)
where c ∈ N areCAI nodes and f ∈ N are FAPnodes. Also, cai_uploadc and cai_downloadc
are the published upload and download speeds for CAI nodes (10 Gbps).
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Simple Model: Layer-1 Edges. Figure 3.9 depicts the layer-1 edges in the simple model.
Layer-1 edges represent physical cable runs between nodes. The simple model layer-1 edges
mimic the design of a portion of the actual USVI Internet infrastructure where population
and CAI nodes connect to a nearby FAP, and FAPs are joined together by a ring. Node
‘fap1’ is the super FAP and serves as a gateway for all FAP traffic and connects to the IXP
‘ip_exchange’ which provides a physical path to the rest of the Internet depicted as ‘conus’.
Figure 3.9. Simple Model: Layer-1 Edges. Layer 1 edges, represented as
black lines, physically connect all nodes in the simple model.
Simple Model: Layer-2 Edges. Layer-2 edges represent the links between nodes that
perform switching functions. Although layer-2 links logically ignore nodes that only
perform layer-1 functions, we represent layer-2 links in Figure 3.10 as following the layer-1
paths that they operate through. Nodes that perform layer-2 functions are assigned a primary
layer-2 and sometimes an alternate layer-2 uplink to adjacent nodes. For example, ‘fap1’
only has a primary uplink through layer-2 edge (‘fap1’, ‘ip_exchange’). On the other hand,
‘fap2’ has a primary uplink on layer-2 edge (‘fap2’, ‘fap1’) and an alternate uplink on
layer-2 edge (‘fap2’, ‘fap3’). Each layer-2 link has a provided bandwidth attribute which is
calculated later.
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Figure 3.10. Simple Model: Layer-2 Edges. Layer-2 edges, represented
as green lines, provide links between nodes that perform layer-2 functions.
Although layer-2 links logically ignore nodes that only perform layer-1 func-
tions, for simplicity this image depicts layer-2 links along the layer-1 paths
they follow.
Simple Model: Layer-3 Edges. Layer-3 edges represent the segments between routers
(i.e., nodes that perform routing functions). Since there are multiple possible layer-1 paths
and layer-2 links between routers, it is not possible to describe the physical locations of
these segments. As a result, we display layer-3 segments as point-to-point lines between
routers, ignoring the possible intermediate nodes. Figure 3.11 depicts the layer-3 edges in
our simple model. All population nodes and CAI nodes are connected to the IXP which
then routes traffic to its final destination.
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Figure 3.11. Simple Model: Layer-3 Edges. Layer-3 edges, represented
as blue lines, provide routes between nodes that perform layer-3 functions.
Layer-3 edges are shown as logical end-to-end routes between nodes because
there are multiple possible layer-2 links and layer-1 paths between them.
Simple Model: Layer-4 Edges. Layer-4 edges represent the connections between appli-
cations that generate and consume Internet traffic. Like layer-3 routes, there are multiple
possible layer-1 paths, layer-2 links, and layer-3 segments that provide service to a layer-4
flows so it is not possible to describe the physical location of these connections. The layer-4
host-to-host connections are depicted in Figure 3.12.
Figure 3.12. Simple Model: Layer-4 Edges. Layer-4 edges, represented as
red lines, provide connections between hosts. Layer-4 edges are shown as
logical host-to-host connections between nodes because there are multiple
possible layer-3 segments, layer-2 links, and layer-1 paths between them.
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3.2.4 Synthetic Network Generation
To generate a synthetic network for our simple model, we import data for the nodes and
edges (layers 1-4) and then combine them into a single GeoDataFrame object for processing
(GeoPandasDevelopment Team2019). Because information flows bothways in the Internet,
we create two directed arcs for each undirected edge.
Layer-1 Network Construction
All nodes and layer-1 edges initially have their Available? attribute set to TRUE. We
developed a function in Python that takes layer-1 nodes or edges we wish to disable as an
input and changes their Available? attribute to FALSE. If a node is input as disabled, the
node and every layer-1 edge adjacent to the node is set to FALSE. If a layer-1 edge is input as
disabled, only that layer-1 edge is set to FALSE. The function is cable of handling multiple
node and layer-1 edges as inputs. The output of this function is an updated Internet graph
G where all nodes and layer-1 edges have the appropriate Available? attribute.
Layer-2 Network Construction
Next we create the layer-2 network. To do this, we developed a function in Python that
takes the updated layer-1 nodes and edges with the appropriate available? attribute as an
input. First, the function examines each layer-2 edge and checks to see if any of its layer-1
component arcs are Available? = FALSE. If any component arc is FALSE, the associated
layer-2 edge is flagged as FALSE. If all component arcs are available, the layer-2 edge is
flagged as TRUE. Next, the function examines each layer-2 node and selects the appropriate
uplink based on TRUE layer-2 edges. Each layer-2 node has at least one primary uplink.
If the primary uplink is available, the primary uplink is assigned Available? = True.
If the primary uplink is FALSE, but the layer-2 node has an available alternate uplink, the
alternate is assigned TRUE. If neither the primary nor the alternate are TRUE, then no uplink
is assigned TRUE. This process is completed once for each layer-2 node. All layer-2 edges
with Available? = True are added to G.
Then, the function checks to see if the network requires self-healing. In practice, if the
layer-2 network is partitioned into multiple connected components, it will attempt to self
heal and use new layer-1 runs that can transmit traffic. To simulate this process, we check
to see if the layer-2 network is connected. If multiple network components exist, we test
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whether adding a secondary uplink for all nodes will reduce the number of components.
If adding in an additional secondary link reestablishes layer-2 connectivity, it is added to
the network. If it does not change the number of connected components, it is not added to
the network. This routine continues until either the network is full connected, or once all
secondary uplinks are tried and the network remains partitioned. Taken together, the final
output of the network construction and self-healing routines is a synthetic layer-2 network
that represents a viable routing for USVI Internet traffic.
Layer-3 Network Construction
The layer-3 network for the USVI is a star network, as all traffic transiting from one ISP
to another needs to pass through an IXP, and there is only a single IXP on STX. For this
reason, we generate the network by connecting all routers to the network IXP (Node Type
6).
Layer-4 Network Construction
Layer 4 is a fully connected network | f lows | = hosts(hosts− 1) weighted based on upload
and download demands. The amount of traffic passed between hosts is weighted based on
the “size” of the host. We use population and CAI upload and download rates as a surrogate
weight for host nodes. We then determine host-host traffic flows by modifying the gravity
model presented in Crain (2012) to consider population and CAI Internet demands.
Index use
n ∈ N Nodes (alias s, t )
Data [units]
Dtot Total Internet demand across the network [Gbps]
Ds Demand associated with node s [Gbps]
Dt Demand associated with node t [Gbps]
Tst Total traffic exchanged between node s and node t [Gbps]









Tst ∀s, t ∈ N, s , t
btt = −Dt ∀t ∈ N
Using the above equations, we developed a Python function that takes nodes and the type
of demand we want to analyze (average or peak) and outputs a traffic matrix that shows the
portion of traffic passed between each host node. The simple model average and peak traffic
matrices are depicted in Tables 3.7 and 3.8.
Table 3.7. Simple Model Traffic Matrix, Average Demand
cai estate stt_stj conus
cai -1.0 0.0005 0.0019 0.045
estate 0 -0.0005 0 0
stt_stj 0 0 -0.0020 0
conus 0.0023 0 0 -0.050
Note: ‘community_anchor_institution’ is abbreviated as ‘cai’. Rows represent
source nodes and columns represent destination nodes. Diagonal values are nega-
tive the source node average demand.
Table 3.8. Simple Model Traffic Matrix, Peak Demand
cai estate stt_stj conus
cai -10 0.076 0.27 1.3
estate 0.0038 -0.50 0.0032 0.0040
stt_stj 0.053 0.013 -2.0 0.062
conus 6.7 0.40 1.5 -50
Note: ‘community_anchor_institution’ is abbreviated as ‘cai’. Rows represent
source nodes and columns represent destination nodes. Diagonal values are nega-
tive the source node peak demand.
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Traffic Assignment
The final step in generating our synthetic network is to assign layer-4 traffic over layer-3
routes, layer-2 links, and layer-1 runs. To do this, we developed a function in Python
that takes the available Internet nodes, edges for all layers, and the layer-4 traffic matrix
as input. The function first creates a network for layers 4, 3, and 2 in the NetworkX
software library (Hagberg et al. 2008). It then iterates over all host-host pairs ((s, t,4) ∈ E)
and finds the shortest path between (s, t) among layer-3 edges using the build-in function
dijkstra_path. This determines the shortest segment-path between hosts. We continue
this procedure on layer 2 to determine the shortest link-path between hosts (if one exists). If
a link-path between hosts exists, we then determine the associated run-path between hosts
using layer-2 component arcs. Once (s, t) host-to-host routing is established on layers 1, 2, 3,
and 4, we assign upload and download traffic to layer-2 links and layer-1 runs. Additionally,
we measure the amount of traffic each host node receives to measure how much traffic was
demanded and served for each host. The output of this function areGeoDataFrames for layer-
1 edges, layer-2 edges, and Internet nodes with traffic assignments. These GeoDataFrames
can be exported and visualized in QGIS to see the concentration of traffic moving through
the network.
We measure Internet traffic using three metrics. First, we measure amount of demand
disconnected from the Internet, Ddisconnected . When network paths exist at all layers,
Ddisconnected = 0. Otherwise, it is equal to the total demand that could not flow across the
Internet in Gbps.
Second, we measure network congestion, Cst , for each link in layer 2 ((s, t,2) ∈ E):
Cst =

1 − Bandwidthst−TrafficstBandwidthst , if Trafficst ≤ Bandwidthst ;
1, otherwise.
(3.9)
For a given Internet traffic scenario, we report network congestion as the layer-2 link closest
to its maximum bandwidth, Cmaxst . In general, Internet networks are capacity-constrained
at the layer-2 link level (layer-1 runs have theoretically infinite capacity). The closer a
layer-2 link is to its maximum bandwidth, the closer the STX Internet is to having unserved
consumer demand. Cmaxst > 0 if the network is operating within normal bandwidth limits
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and Cmaxst = 1 when there is greater demand than layer 2 can support.
Finally, we measure the total unserved demand, U. We measure this as the amount of traffic
beyond the capacity of layer-2 links. U is zero if all layer-2 links are under capacity (i.e.,
Cmaxst < 1). Otherwise, U is the amount of traffic that exceeds the network flow capacities
in Gbps.
3.2.5 Network Analysis for Simple Model
Consider a situation where all layer-1 path segments in the simple model are available and
all hosts are using their average demand. Analyzing the layer-1 edges, which capture the
aggregate traffic flow over each layer-1 edge segment, provides valuable insight into the
behavior of the simple model.
Figure 3.13. Layer 1 Traffic Assignment in Simple Model, All Edges Avail-
able. Aggregate traffic over layer 1 edges with all layer 1 edges available.
White lines indicate no traffic flow. Traffic flow over edges increases from
green to red as the amount of traffic flow over the layer 1 edge increases.
Figure 3.13 depicts all layer-1 edges with their traffic flows. Edge segment are colored based
on the amount of traffic flowing over each segment. White segments indicate no traffic flow.
Light yellow indicates a small amount of traffic flow which gradually transitions to dark
red to indicate a large amount of traffic flow. In Figure 3.13, we see that there is no flow
on the (‘fap2’, ‘fap3’) and (‘fap3’, ‘fap1’) edges. This is because ‘fap2’ is sending all of
its traffic flow over its primary uplink, to ‘fap1’, and ‘fap3’ has no hosts demanding traffic
through it. The layer-1 edge (‘estate’, ‘j1’) has the least traffic flow, indicated by its light
yellow color, because ‘estate’ has the least demand. The layer-1 edge (‘ip_exchange’,‘fap1’)
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has the most traffic flow, indicated by its dark red color, because all of the demand from
‘stt_stj’, the ‘community_anchor_institution’, and the flow through it from ‘estate’ to reach
the ‘ip_exchange’.
Consider another situation where the layer-1 edge segment (‘fap1’, ‘fap2’) has been de-
stroyed and all hosts are using their average demand.
Figure 3.14. Layer-1 Traffic Assignment in Simple Model, One Edge De-
stroyed. Aggregate traffic over layer-1 edges with edge (‘fap1’, ‘fap2’) de-
stroyed. The black ‘X’ represents a fiber optic cable cut. White lines indicate
no traffic flow. Color on edges increases from green to red as the amount of
traffic flow over the layer-1 edge increases. Traffic flow has been re-routed
over an alternate layer-2 route.
Figure 3.14 depicts all new layer-1 edges and the same color scale applies. Because edge
(‘fap1’, ‘fap2’) was removed from the network it no longer has any flow over it. Instead,
‘fap2’ is using its alternate uplink to ‘fap3’ and ‘fap3’ is using its primary uplink to send
that traffic to ‘fap1’. The other layer-1 edge segments see no change in the flow over them.
We assess operational impacts of traffic re-routing using Ddisconnected , Cmaxst , and U (Ta-
ble 3.9). In general, network re-routing will lead to some layer-2 links having increased
traffic, congestion, and unserved demand. Moreover, depending on the location of the
destroyed infrastructure, customers may be disconnected. In this simple scenario, how-
ever, we note that neither customers are disconnected, congestion increases, nor demand
becomes unserved. This is due to the equivalent operations of both network paths, even
though re-routing over the alternate layer-2 route requires more hops and is less efficient
with respect to physical and logical distance.
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Table 3.9. Internet Traffic Metrics for the Simple Model
Scenario Ddisconnected (Gbps) Cmaxst U (Gbps)
All Edges Available 0 0.005 0
One Edge Destroyed 0 0.005 0
3.3 STX Internet System Model
The multi-layer Internet network model captures the types of infrastructure, functions, and
relationships of the USVI Internet system. We use the format of the model and simple
example to build a descriptive model of the USVI Internet system, focusing on STX.
Building on the data previously curated into geospatial data files in QGIS during the data
curation phase of our work, we conduct additional processing to have the correct attributes
and data formats.
3.3.1 Nodes in the STX Internet System Model
Our STX Internet system model contains a total of 1,068 nodes. Like in the simple model,
each node is assigned 14 attributes based on the function and characteristics of that node.
These nodes are visually depicted in Figure 3.15. The color of each node corresponds with
the highest level of the OSI model at which the node operates.
Population Node Calculations
Population nodes operate at all four layers of the OSI model. The population nodes for the
STX Internet system model include the 233 private Internet customers previously curated
as well as synthetic population nodes representing a combined STT/STJ and CONUS.
For purposes of defining traffic demand, the STT/STJ synthetic node represents the entire
population of STT and STJ as a single node, and the CONUS synthetic node represents the
entire population of the US. The average and peak demand for STX population nodes were
calculated using the formula:
avg_demandp = householdsp × penetrationp × avg_scrb_dmdp (3.10)
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Figure 3.15. Nodes in the STX Internet System Model. Node colors align
with the highest level of the OSI model at which the node operates: black
nodes are junction nodes (fiber junctions and cable landing sites), green
nodes are switch nodes (FAPs and Super FAP), blue nodes are router nodes
(IXPs and NAPs), and red nodes are host nodes (population centers and
CAIs). Nodes representing locations on STT/STJ and CONUS exist but are
not shown here.
peak_demandp = householdsp × penetrationp × peak_scrb_dmdp (3.11)
where p is a population node on STX, householdsp is the number of households at the
node, penetrationp is the percentage of the households that have Internet service, and
avg_scrb_dmdp) and peak_scrb_dmdp are the average and peak subscriber Internet demand.
The penetration of Internet in the USVI is 54.8% (Central Intelligence Agency 2020), the
average Internet demand is assumed to be 1Mbps, and the peak Internet demand is assumed
to be 5 Mbps.
The average and peak demand for the STT/STJ and CONUS population nodes were calcu-








× penetrationp × peak_scrb_dmdp (3.13)
where p is a population node in STT/STJ or CONUS, population(p) is population of the
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node, avg_household_size(p) is the average household size in the US, penetration(p) is
the percentage of the households that have Internet service, and avg_scrb_dmd(p) and
peak_scrb_dmd(p) are the average and peak household Internet demand. The average
household size in the US is 2.52 people, the penetration of Internet at STT/STJ is 54.8%,
the penetration of Internet in CONUS node is 73.00%, the average Internet demand is
assumed to be 1 Mbps, and the peak Internet demand is assumed to be 5 Mbps (Central
Intelligence Agency 2020; Pew Research Center 2019; U.S. Census Bureau 2019).
CAI Node Calculations
CAI nodes also operate at all four layers of the OSI model. The CAI nodes for the STX
Internet system model include the 133 CAIs previously curated. Although CAIs do not
have a population assigned to them, they do have a maximum upload and download speed
for each node which was used to calculate the average and peak Internet demand for each
CAI using the formula:
avg_demandc = subscrb_dwnc × avg_cai_usec (3.14)
peak_demandc = subscrb_dwnc × peak_cai_usec (3.15)
where c is a CAI node, subscrb_dwn(c) is the given CAI maximum download rate,
avg_cai_use(c) is the average amount of the maximum download rate that is used,
and peak_cai_use(c) is the peak amount of the maximum download rate that is used.
avg_cai_use(c) is assumed to be 10% and peak_cai_use(c) is assumed to be 100%.
3.3.2 Layer-1 Edges in the STX Internet System Model
We compile edges for the STX Internet system model from known elements of the last
mile, middle mile, and backbone infrastructure. Additionally, synthetic layer-1 edges were
created to connect the STT/STJ synthetic population node to the middle mile infrastructure
and the CONUS synthetic population node to the two CONUS NAPs. In total, there are
2,478 individual layer-1 edge segments representing the entire physical fiber optic cable
infrastructure. The 2,478 STX Internet system model layer-1 edges are visually depicted in
Figure 3.16. The middle mile and backbone edges are black, and last mile edges are grey.
The destination of edges that provide paths to nodes off the map are annotated.
48
Figure 3.16. Layer-1 Edges in the STX Internet System Model. Middle mile
and backbone edges are black and last mile edges are grey. The destination
of edges that provide paths to nodes off the map are annotated. FAP, Super
FAP, and IXP nodes are identified in green and blue, respectively.
3.3.3 Layer-2 Edges in the STX Internet System Model
The layer-2 edges in this model were developed differently for different source destination
pairs. For layer-2 edges between customers on STX and FAPs, a Dijkstra’s shortest path
algorithm was used to calculate the shortest path (in meters) from each customer node to
every FAP. The closest FAP was selected and a layer-2 edge was then created between that
customer and its nearest FAP. The STT/STJ synthetic node was provided a layer-2 link to
FAP STX-02 through the viNGN submarine cables.
The remaining layer-2 edges were manually decided. For FAP-to-FAP layer-2 edges, a
primary and alternate linkwas chosen from each FAP to adjacent FAPs. Because themiddle-
mile infrastructure on STX generally forms rings, we chose the primary link destination and
layer-1 runs it follows based on the shorter direction around the ring towards the Super FAP.
Alternate layer-2 links were chosen to provide layer-1 path diversity (i.e., different layer-1
paths than the primary path) to a FAP in the other direction around the ring (i.e., away from
the Super FAP). Figure 3.17 provides an example of pair of primary and alternate FAP
layer-2 links.
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Figure 3.17. Primary and Alternate Layer-2 Links in STX Internet Model.
The primary layer-2 link from FAP STX-06, highlighted in bright green, is
counter-clockwise through the middle mile ring to FAP STX-04. The primary
link allows FAP STX-06 to move layer-2 traffic closer to FAP STX-02, the
Super FAP. The alternate layer-2 link, highlighted in orange, is clockwise
through the middle mile ring to FAP STX-07. The alternate link provides a
backup layer-1 path for moving Internet traffic through the middle mile.
FAP STX-02, the Super FAP was provided a primary layer-2 link to the Global Crossing
NAP. FAP STX-02 does not have an alternate layer-2 link, since there is no alternate set
of layer-1 runs that would connect it the the IXP. The Global Crossing NAP is assigned
a primary layer-2 link to the Florida NAP and an alternate to the New York NAP. The
CONUS synthetic node was manually assigned a primary layer 2 link to the Florida NAP
and an alternate to the New York NAP. The Florida NAP and New York NAP were each
assigned layer-2 links to the Global Crossing NAP through unique submarine cable routes.
The 392 edges in the USVI Internet system layer-2 are visually depicted in Figure 3.18.
Some layer-1 paths, such as the eastern submarine cable between STX and STT, are not
used to provide layer-2 links because no nodes uplink traffic through them.
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Figure 3.18. Layer-2 Edges in the STX Internet System Model. Red nodes
represent customer nodes, green nodes represent FAP nodes, and blue nodes
represent IXP nodes. Layer-2 edges are represented by green lines. Layer-2
edges between customer nodes and FAPs are represented as straight green
lines and do not follow layer-1 paths. All other layer-2 links, such as those
between FAPs, do follow layer-1 paths.
3.3.4 Layer-3 Edges in the STX Internet System Model
In our STX Internet system model, layer-3 edges are routes between all customer nodes
and the Global Crossing IXP on STX. Since there are multiple possible layer-1 paths and
layer-2 links between customer nodes and the IXP, it is not possible to describe the physical
locations of these routes. The point-to-point layer-3 routes between all customer nodes and
the IXP are visually depicted in QGIS in Figure 3.19.
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Figure 3.19. Layer-3 Edges in STX Internet System Model. Red nodes
represent customer nodes and blue nodes represent IXP nodes. Layer-3
edges between all customer nodes and the IXP are represented by blue lines.
3.3.5 Layer-4 Edges in the STX Internet System Model
In our STX Internet system model, layer-4 edges are connections between all customer
nodes. Like layer-3 routes, there are multiple possible layer-1 paths, layer-2 links, and
layer-3 routes that form a layer-4 connection so it is not possible to describe the physical
location of these connections. There are 67,528 layer-4 host-to-host connections included
in the STX Internet system model to connect all host-host pairs.
3.3.6 Synthetic Network Generation in STX Internet System Model
In our STX Internet system model, synthetic network generation follows the same process
as the simple model. Working with real data for STX, however, requires a few additional
attributes for population and CAI nodes which allows us to make more realistic calculations
for provided bandwidth on layer-2 edges. Provided bandwidth for edges from population
nodes to FAP nodes are calculated as:
provided_bandwidth(p, f ) =
populationp
avg_household_sizep
× penetrationp × isp_uploadp (3.16)
provided_bandwidth( f ,p)) =
populationp
avg_household_sizep
× penetrationp × isp_downloadp (3.17)
where p are population nodes and f are FAP nodes. Here, populationp is the population
at p, avg_household_sizep is the average household size at p, penetrationp is the Internet
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penetration at p, and isp_download(p) is the average ISP download speed. The average
household size in the US is 2.52 people, the penetration of Internet in the USVI is 54.8%,
the ISP upload from Viya is 5 Mbps, and the ISP download from Viya is 25 Mbps (Central
Intelligence Agency 2020; Pew Research Center 2019; Viya 2020).
Provided bandwidth for edges from CAI nodes to FAP nodes are calculated as:
provided_bandwidth(c, f ) = peak_demandc. (3.18)
provided_bandwidth( f ,c) = peak_demandc. (3.19)
where c are CAI nodes and f are FAP nodes. Here, peak_demandc is the peak demand
previously calculated for each CAI node.
The provided bandwidth on layer-2 edges between all other nodes is assumed to be 10 Gbps.
3.4 Summary
The Internet is a complicated system, and understanding its structure and behavior requires
careful attention to the attributes of each of its layers. Even a system of modest size, like
the system in STX, has thousands of components and connections. The methods presented
here serve as a rigorous means to capture essential features. Understanding the implications
of these features in terms of the system traffic and vulnerability is the subject of the next
chapter.
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Using the methods presented in Chapter 3, we analyze the operation of the Internet on
STX. We generate a model of the STX Internet and assess the relationship between
Internet infrastructure and customers. We estimate the Internet demand on the viNGN
middle mile and measure approximated traffic flows. Results provide an estimate of viNGN
infrastructure criticality and vulnerability to support recovery and mitigation operations for
future disasters. Results also show how synthetic network generation methods may produce
a reasonable model of the STX Internet alongside modeling issues that need to be resolved
to capture real network operations.
4.1 How St. Croix Internet Customers Connect to viNGN
Middle Mile Infrastructure
We assess how dependent STX communities, households, and CAIs are served by viNGN
middle mile infrastructure using synthetic network generation techniques. We use these
results to estimate average and peak Internet demand for viNGN FAPs and middle mile
infrastructure.
4.1.1 Customer Dependence on FAPs
Synthetic network generation methods for layer 1 provide a means to estimate which popu-
lations and geographic regions are served by each FAP. We implement synthetic network
generation techniques found in the literature by assuming each population center connects
to its nearest FAP based on the STX road network. In general, this is a reasonable approx-
imation as the majority of Internet fiber runs lie underneath roads or are adjacent to roads
on above ground power poles. Moreover, ISPs would often construct their layer-1 network
with as few fiber runs as possible to be cost effective.
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Relating Middle Mile Infrastructure to STX Estates
We associate STX Internet customers to FAPs to determine how geographic regions are
served by the viNGN middle mile. Figure 4.1 presents the synthetic network generation
results for FAPs STX-02 and STX-03. Results indicate that population connectivity to
the viNGN middle mile does not necessarily match the local geographic and jurisdictional
boundaries associatedwith estates. For example, Figure 4.1 shows estates near Fredericksted
can have multiple population centers that connect to either STX-02 or STX-03. This result is
possible in the ‘real’ network due to neighborhood growth and ISPs expanding their service
regions. Additionally, some estates do not appear the be serviced by any FAPs due to a lack
of population.
Figure 4.1. Customers Served by STX-02 and STX-03 Fiber Access Points.
The customers (i.e., populations and CAIs) that connect to FAP STX-02
are represented in purple and FAP STX-03 represented in pink. We find
regions where population centers near each other connect to different FAPs.
We also find customers far from each FAP connecting in to the middle mile
over potentially indirect routes. FAPs are represented in green and layer-1
last mile infrastructure represented by grey lines. Other FAP customers are
omitted for visual clarity.
To better relate the STX Internet system model to real-world demands, we estimate which
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FAP is the primary connection point for each estate through manual inspection. We present
the relationship between Internet customers and estates in Figure 4.2 and FAPs in Figure 4.3.
When synthetic network generation produces estates that are wholly occupied by customers
of a single FAP, manual assignment is trivial. In contrast, instances where an estate has no
known residential customers and/or are served bymultiple FAPs require additional methods.
Specifically, if an estate has no customers, the estate was assigned to a FAP based on the
customers in neighboring estates and geographic proximity. If the estate has customers
assigned to more than one FAP, that estate is assigned based on the population majority and
geographic proximity.
Figure 4.2. St. Croix Internet Customers Colored by Assigned Facility Access
Point. Due to overlapping regions, STX estates are assigned to a FAP by
manual inspection. FAPs and their assigned customers overlaid on STX
estate boarders (white lines). FAPs are presented in green. Customer colors
correspond to estate colors in Figure 4.3.
Both synthetic network generation and manual inspection indicate that the location of
viNGN middle mile infrastructure does not necessarily correspond to existing population
centers and estates. This may be due to the early focus of viNGN to ensure connectivity of
CAIs, rather than communities. This result may also be due to rules of right of way, leasing
land for laying fiber runs, or changes in infrastructure systems that layer-1 network structure
is interdependent with (e.g., the road network).
Overall, this result suggests that theremay be idiosyncrasies of the STX Internet not captured
in common synthetic network generation methods. For example, Figure 4.3 shows that our
synthetic network generation methods would connect FAP STX-04 to customers or regions
57
Figure 4.3. St. Croix Estates Colored by Primary Facility Access Point. We
assign each estate to a FAP by manual inspection. Estate color correspond
to customer nodes presented in Figure 4.2. FAPs are presented in green.
without service on the northwest coast. This result is non-intuitive, and implausible based
on the distance between the viNGN middle mile and the northwest coast. In addition,
methods generate instances where FAPs do not service estates directly adjacent to them.
While this takes into account the last mile infrastructure and road network, the distinction
between which customers are served by nearby FAPs STX-07 and STX-17, for example, is
potentially unrealistic.
Relating Populations and CAIs to FAPs
We use the results of synthetic network generation to estimate the number of people and
critical facilities served by each FAP. Figure 4.4 presents the total population connecting
into the viNGN middle mile at each FAPs. Results show the differences in importance
for each FAP for STX communities. In particular, FAP STX-02, STX-03, STX-13, and
STX-17 service more private Internet customers, with each FAP providing connectivity for
over 6,000 people. These FAPs also correspond with the largest population centers on the
island: STX-02 and STX-03 are located near Frederiksted on the west end of the island,
and STX-13 and STX-17 are located near Christiansted on the east end of the island.
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Figure 4.4. Population Serviced by Each Facility Access Point. The popu-
lation serviced by each FAP. FAPs located in more densely populated areas
service larger populations.
In addition to determining FAP importance based on population, we also measure impor-
tance based on CAIs. Figure 4.5 presents the number of CAIs connected to each FAP.
In general, we find FAPs that service large populations also service a large number of
CAIs, such as STX-02 and STX-17. This result is intuitive because government buildings,
schools, and churches are located in population centers. A notable departure from this trend
is FAP STX-03 which services 15.38% of the population, the most out of any FAP, but only
services 7.52% of the CAIs.
More specifically, the importance of a given FAP differs for different CAI types. For
example, medical facilities, public safety agencies, and government buildings may be
prioritized over libraries or schools during or immediately after a disaster. We find that
certain FAPs may not provide Internet connectivity to these critical facilities. Specifically,
FAP STX-06 and STX-07 do not serve any public safety facilities (CAI Type 4). Moreover,
only FAPs STX-02, STX-13, STX-15, and STX-17 provide Internet to medical facilities
(CAI Type 3).
Taken together, results provide an rough estimate of the importance of viNGN FAPs. In
particular, STX-02 and STX-17 may be the two most important FAPs for both population
and CAI Internet access. This estimate of importance, combined with a future traffic-
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dependency analysis will enable prioritization of FAPs for hardening against hurricanes
and other disasters.
Figure 4.5. Community Anchor Institutions Serviced By Each Facility Access
Point. Each FAP provides Internet connectivity for a different combination
of CAIs on STX. For example, FAP stx-17 and stx-02 serve the greatest
number of CAIs. CAI categories include: (1) School K-12, (2) Library,
(3) Medical/healthcare, (4) Public Safety, (5) University College or Post-
secondary School, (6) Other community support — governmental, and, (7)
Other community support — non-governmental.
60
4.1.2 FAP Bandwidth Requirements to Serve Customers
We use the above results to estimate the bandwidth requirements for each FAP on STX.
Figure 4.6 presents the estimates of average and peak demand by FAP. All download and
upload Internet traffic must enter the viNGN middle mile through FAPs. Based on popu-
lation and CAI requirements, we estimate that under average Internet demand conditions,
there is a total of 12.54 Gbps of customer demand in the network with a mean demand of
1.15 Gbps per FAP. FAP STX-17 has the highest demand with 2.00 Gbps followed closely
by STX-02 and STX-03 with 1.88 Gbps and 1.80 Gbps respectively. FAP STX-16 has the
smallest demand with 0.23 Gbps. Under peak conditions, there is a total of 69.69 Gbps of
customer demand in the network with a mean demand of 6.34 Gbps per FAP. FAP STX-17
has the highest demand with 12.73 Gbps followed by STX-02 and STX-03 with 10.61 Gbps
and 9.46 Gbps respectively. FAP STX-16 has the smallest demand with 1.43 Gbps.
Figure 4.6. Average and Peak Demand per Fiber Access Point. Average In-
ternet demand measure the estimated traffic generated at each FAP during
a normal day. Peak Internet demand represents the possible maximum de-
mand that could be generated from Internet customers based on max upload
and download rates.
It is possible that synthetic network generation overestimates Internet demand on STX.
We know that the bandwidth on each layer-2 link in the viNGN middle mile is 10 Gbps.
However, synthetic network generation produces average demand on the island that exceeds
this limit (12.54 Gbps). If this result is accurate, it would mean daily Internet use on STX is
rate limited, and network protocols would be reducing total traffic from Internet customers.
Moreover, the total peak demand is much greater than bandwidth limits (69.69 Gbps).
If these were accurate, it would mean that the existing network is operating a severely
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congested state, which is not typical of wholesale middle-mile providers.
Still, the distribution of demand across each FAPmay be accurate, where FAPs serving large
populations also have the greatest total demand. This means that the results presented in
Figure 4.6 are useful to determine relative volumes of Internet traffic flows, but the absolute
value of unserved demands may be overestimated.
4.2 Synthetic St. Croix Internet Traffic and Network Op-
erations
We use the customer and FAP results to approximate network traffic on the STX Internet
system model and assess the implications of infrastructure failures for Internet users.
4.2.1 TrafficAssignment Scenarios for the STX Internet SystemModel
We generate flow maps and aggregate traffic to show how the STX Internet system model
functions in normal and failure scenarios. We consider traffic in five fictitious scenarios
that help reveal the vulnerability of Internet access to layer-1 cable cuts and demand spikes:
• Scenario 1: Average Internet demand, all infrastructure operational;
• Scenario 2: Average Internet demand, single fiber run cut along the middle mile
ring;
• Scenario 3: Average Internet demand, two fiber run cuts along the middle mile ring;
• Scenario 4: Average Internet demand, single fiber run cut between the SuperFAP
and the IXP;
• Scenario 5: Peak Internet demand, all infrastructure operational.
Scenario 1: Average Demand, All Infrastructure Operational
We measure flows on the STX Internet system model with average demands and all in-
frastructure available to assess Internet traffic during normal operations. Figures 4.7 and
4.8 presents Internet traffic from FAPs into the viNGN middle mile and then off island via
submarine cables to North America. Table 4.1 presents the total traffic over each layer-2
link within the middle mile.
62
Figure 4.7. St. Croix Middle Mile Traffic under Scenario 1. The amount
of Internet traffic flowing on the STX middle mile is represented by shaded
lines. Green lines represent light traffic and red lines represent high traffic.
Unused layer-2 links are represented as grey lines.
Table 4.1. Layer 2 Aggregate Traffic Between FAPs under Scenario 1.











Note: All FAP-to-FAP layer-2 links are bidirectional (upload/download), but traffic
flows are dominated by download rates. We assume each FAP-FAP link has a
maximum bandwidth of 10 Gbps. Links that do not flow traffic or are disconnected
from the network are omitted.
Figure 4.7 provides a baseline for understanding how Internet traffic flows on STX. Results
indicate that not all layer-2 links or layer-1 fiber runswithin the viNGNmiddlemile transport
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Figure 4.8. St. Croix Layer-2 Connectivity to Customers Under Scenario 1.
Population centers with Internet subscribers are represented by red circles
with total traffic (upload and download) represented by shaded lines. Green
lines represent light network traffic and red lines represent heavy traffic.
Unused layer-2 links are represented as grey lines.
Internet traffic during normal operations. Specifically, Figure 4.7 shows that viNGNmiddle
mile forms a tree network, where SuperFAP STX-02 serves as the central node and two
branching link-paths form along central and southern STX. The link-path through central
STX starts at Christiansted with FAP STX-07 and transports traffic along Centerline Road.
The southern link-path starts at FAP STX-12 on the eastern end of the island and transports
traffic along the Melvin H. Evans Highway. FAP STX-15 forms a second branch off the
southern link-path. All paths terminate at the Super FAP which then forwards all traffic to
the IXP for exchange between ISPs andNorth America. Notably, the links STX-07–STX-17,
and STX-15–STX-17 are not utilized during normal operations.
Figure 4.8 shows how the layer-2 traffic from Figure 4.7 relates to population centers and
CAIs. Under this scenario, all customers are connected to the Internet.
Table 4.1 shows which layer-2 links flow the greatest Internet traffic during normal opera-
tions. In general, no layer-2 link within the viNGN middle mile ring is near its maximum
bandwidth. However, as traffic is aggregated at the Super FAP, STX-02, and then forwarded
to the IXP and North America, it becomes bandwidth limited. Here, all 12.54 Gbps con-
verge on to a single link between STX-02 and the IXP. This value exceeds the assumed
bandwidth constraint of 10 Gbps. viNGN leases dark fiber between the IXP and Miami,
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and the IXP to New York, each operating with 10 Gbps capacity.
Internet traffic during normal network operations indicates possible vulnerabilities within
the STX Internet system model. While layer-2 determines final traffic flow paths, failures
in layer-1 (physical) may lead to traffic re-routing, increased network congestion, unserved
demands, and disconnected customers. As Layer-2 links along Centerline Road and the
Melvin H. Evans highway form the only connections between middle mile FAPs and the
Super FAP, cable cuts in layer 1 on either or both of these roads may lead to customers
losing Internet access. Equivalently, the link between the Super FAP and the IXP appears
to be a possible “most-vital arc” (Alderson et al. 2013). A cable cut in layer-1 along this
link may disconnect the entire island. Moreover, even if layer-1 is fully available, we expect
to see bandwidth limitations between the Super FAP and the IXP during situations of peak
demand. We assess these scenarios to understand the vulnerability of the STX Internet
system model.
Scenario 2: Average Demand, Fiber Cut on Melvin H. Evans Highway
We study traffic re-routing and network congestion for a cable cut on the Melvin H. Evans
Highway. Figures 4.9 and 4.10 present traffic routing and connectivity. Table 4.2 presents
the total traffic flows over the viNGN middle mile.
Scenario 1 revealed that a fiber run cut along the highway could force traffic to re-route
over Centerline Road (i.e., the central STX link-path). Figure 4.9 shows how the layer-2
topology can self-heal to circumvent the fiber cut and to ensure all Internet customers
remain connected to the network. In particular, the previously un-used link between FAP
STX-07 and STX-17 is utilized to ensure all FAPs can connect to the Super FAP and IXP.
Accordingly, all Internet traffic is routed over Centerline Road. Figure 4.10 shows that all
Internet customers on STX remain connected to the network after the cable cut.
Despite customers maintaining connectivity, Table 4.2 shows that re-routing may lead to
higher network congestion and unserved Internet demand. In Scenario 1, all traffic on STX
converged at the Super FAP, such that the link between STX-02 and the IXP was the only
congestion constrained portion of the network. In Scenario 2, re-routing leads to the link
between STX-02 and STX-03 also being congestion constrained with a total flow of 10.7
Gbps. This flow exceeds the assumed link bandwidth of 10 Gbps.
65
Figure 4.9. St. Croix Middle Mile Traffic under Scenario 2. A fiber cut
along the Melvin H. Evans Highway leads to network self-healing and traffic
re-routing. All middle mile Internet traffic flows along Centerline Road. to
reach the Super FAP (STX-02). The amount of Internet traffic flowing on
the STX middle mile is represented by shaded lines. Green lines represent
light traffic and red lines represent high traffic. Unused layer-2 links are
represented as grey lines. The location of the fiber cut is represented by a
black ‘X’.
Table 4.2. Layer 2 Aggregate Traffic Between FAPs under Scenario 2.










Note: All FAP-to-FAP layer-2 links are bidirectional (upload/download), but traffic
flows are dominated by download rates. We assume each FAP-FAP link has a
maximum bandwidth of 10 Gbps. Links that do not flow traffic or are disconnected
from the network are omitted.
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Figure 4.10. St. Croix Layer-2 Connectivity to Customers Under Scenario 2.
Even with a fiber cut, the middle mile self-heals and no Internet customers
lose connectivity. Customers that with Internet connectivity are represented
by red circles with total traffic (upload and download) represented by shaded
lines. Green lines represent light network traffic and red lines represent heavy
traffic. Unused layer-2 links are represented as grey lines.The location of the
fiber cut is represented by a black ‘X’.
Scenario 3: Average Demand, Fiber Cuts onMelvin H. Evans Highway and Centerline
Road
We study traffic re-routing and network congestion for a cable cut on the Melvin H. Evans
Highway and Centerline Road — both the southern and central branches of the viNGN
middle mile ring. Figures 4.11 and 4.12 present traffic routing and connectivity. Table 4.3
presents the total traffic flows over the viNGN middle mile.
Figure 4.11 presents the Internet traffic across the viNGN middle STX with two cable
cuts. In this scenario, the middle mile ring is unable to self heal, and the majority of STX
customers are unable to connect to the Internet. Figure 4.12 shows that only four FAPs —
STX-02, STX-03, STX-04, and STX-16— have connectivity to the IXP and North America.
A total of 7.8 Gbps from the central and eastern portions of STX is disconnected from the
Internet. Due to customer disconnection, there is a corresponding drop in traffic along
layer-2 links. This reduces Internet congestion, as the total flow of Internet demand from
STX is only 4.74 Gbps (Table 4.3).
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Figure 4.11. St. Croix Middle Mile Traffic under Scenario 3. A fiber cut
along the Melvin H. Evans Highway and Centerline Road disconnects a large
portion of the viNGN middle mile from the Internet. The amount of Internet
traffic flowing on the STX middle mile is represented by shaded lines. Green
lines represent light traffic and red lines represent high traffic. Unused layer-2
links are represented as grey lines. The location of the fiber cut is represented
by a black ‘X’.
Table 4.3. Layer 2 Aggregate Traffic Between FAPs under Scenario 3.




Note: All FAP-to-FAP layer-2 links are bidirectional (upload/download), but traf-
fic flows are dominated by download rates. We assume each FAP-FAP link has
a maximum bandwidth of 10 Gbps. Links that do not transport traffic or are
disconnected from the network are omitted.
Scenario 4: Average Demand, Fiber Cut Between the Super FAP and IXP
In our previous scenarios, we observed a high traffic concentration between SuperFAP
STX-02 and the IXP, suggesting a likely single point of failure in the network. We study a
fiber cut between these two critical network points.
Figure 4.13 presents Internet traffic and customer connectivity to the viNGN middle mile
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Figure 4.12. St. Croix Layer-2 Connectivity to Customers Under Scenario
3. With two fiber cuts, a large number of customers are disconnected from
the Internet (black circles). Customers that with Internet connectivity are
represented by red circles with total traffic (upload and download) repre-
sented by shaded lines. Green lines represent light network traffic and red
lines represent heavy traffic. Unused layer-2 links are represented as grey
lines. The location of fiber cuts is represented by a black ‘X’.
with a single fiber optic cable cut between SuperFAP STX-02 and the IXP. This cut prevents
a layer-2 link from being established between Super FAP STX-02 and IXP and disconnects
the entire territory from the Internet. As a result, there is no traffic at any layer of the OSI
model across STX. Due to the structure and function of the STX Internet system model,
we expect similar results if any fiber run between the Super FAP and IXP is cut, the Super
FAP and/or IXP nodes become unavailable, or if a cable cut occurs at the Internet landing
site north of the IXP.
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Figure 4.13. St. Croix Layer-2 Connectivity to Customers Under Scenario 4.
A single fiber cut between the Super FAP and IXP leads to all customers on
STX losing Internet connectivity (black circles). There is no Internet traffic
within the STX middle mile. Unused layer-2 links are represented as grey
lines. The location of the fiber cut is represented by a black ‘X’.
Scenario 5: Peak Demand, All Infrastructure Available
Finally, we study the impacts of a demand spike on Internet connectivity and congestion.
Here, there are no fiber cuts, but rather all customers on STX demand Internet content at
their provider maximum bandwidth. In this scenario, traffic re-routing does not occur and
follows similar paths to Scenario 1 (see Figure 4.7). However, network congestion does
occur due to significant bandwidth requirements.
Figure 4.14 presents of aggregate (upload and download) traffic on the viNGN middle mile
under peak demand with all layer-1 edges available. Under this scenario, all customers
remain connected to the Internet. The model experiences heavy aggregate layer-2 traffic
over links between CONUS and the SuperFAP (130.3 Gbps) and between the SuperFAP
and STT/STJ (60.6 Gbps).
Table 4.4 shows which FAP-FAP connections are most congested during peak demand.
Because Traffic routing follows the same hub and spoke configuration as average demand
scenarios, congestion occurs over layer-2 links that flow the highest traffic in normal situa-
tions. For example, the layer-2 link between the SuperFAP and the IXP dominate network
congestion. In addition, six more FAP-FAP connections are also expected to be congested
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due to their network traffic exceeding 10Gbps: STX-02-STX-03, STX-02-STX-16, STX-16-
STX-13, STX-03-STX-04, STX-04-STX-05, and STX-13-STX-17. Overall, we expect this
scenario to lead to high network congestion and a significant amount of unserved demand.
Figure 4.14. St. Croix Layer-2 Connectivity to Customers Under Scenario
5. All Internet customers remain connected to the viNGN middle mile and
routing match Scenario 1 (see Figure 4.7). However, peak demand will lead
to significant network congestion. Customers that with Internet connectiv-
ity are represented by red circles with total traffic (upload and download)
represented by shaded lines. Green lines represent light network traffic and
red lines represent heavy traffic. Unused layer-2 links are represented as grey
lines.
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Table 4.4. Layer 2 Aggregate Traffic Between FAPs under Peak Demand











Note: All FAP to FAP layer-2 links are bidirectional (upload/download), but traffic
flows are dominated by download rates. We assume each FAP-FAP link has a
maximum bandwidth of 10 Gbps. Links that do not flow traffic or are disconnected
from the network are omitted.
4.2.2 Estimating STX Internet Operations and Vulnerability
We estimate the impact of re-routing and increased demands on the STX Internet system
model using the three metrics introduced in Section 3.2.4. Ddisconnected is the amount of
customer demand in Gbps disconnected from the Internet. Cmaxst is the network congestion,
estimated by the most congested layer-2 FAP to FAP link. And U is the amount of layer-2
traffic that exceeds link bandwidth on FAP to FAP links. Table 4.5 presents these three
metrics for all five scenarios.
Table 4.5. Scenario Comparison
Scenario Ddisconnected (Gbps) Cmaxst U (Gbps)
1: Average Demand 0.0 0.55 0
2: Average Demand, One Cut 0.0 1 0.7
3: Average Demand, Two Cuts 7.8 0.27 0
4: Average Demand, Catastrophic Cut 12.5 0.0 0
5: Peak Demand 0.0 1 77.4
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During normal network operations (Scenario 1), all customers are connected to the Internet
(Ddisconnected = 0) and the network is not congested, Cmaxst = 0.45. These results suggest
that the viNGN middle mile is capable of supporting our estimated average demand when
all layer-1 fiber runs are operational.
Scenario 2 shows that network re-routing leads to minor network congestion. When a
cable is cut along the Melvin H. Evans Highway, all customers remain connected to the
Internet Ddisconnected = 0. However, layer-2 traffic is transported over Centerline Road
causing demand to exceed layer-2 bandwidth limits (Cmaxst = 1). Still, total unserved
demand is relatively small at U = 0.7 Gbps. These results suggest that the viNGN network
is relatively robust to a single fiber optic cable cut along either the central or southern
link-path.
Scenario 3 is the first scenario where customers are disconnected from the Internet. Specif-
ically, a cable cut along the Highway and Centerline Road disconnects Internet customers
in central and eastern STX, resulting in Ddisconnected = 7.8 Gbps. Disconnecting customers
reduces network demands, such that network congestion is also reduced to Cmaxst = 0.27.
These results indicate that, while multiple cable cuts may disconnect a significant number
of customers, those that remain connected to the network will not experience any network
degradation. In fact, customers on the western side of STX may experience better Internet
connectivity due to reduced congestion.
Scenario 4 demonstrates the vulnerability of the STX Internet systemmodel to single points
of failure. With a single fiber cut between the SuperFAP and the IXP, we see that all
customers are disconnected from the network (Ddisconnected = 24.7 Gbps). This value
includes traffic from STT/STJ that traverse inter-island submarine cables towards the IXP
and North American connectivity. Since there is no traffic flowing through the network,
Cmaxst = 0 and U = 0.
Finally, the peak demand scenario (Scenario 5), provides high estimate of network conges-
tion. Here, all customers are connected to the Internet Ddisconnected = 0, but Cmaxst = 1,
indicating that a layer-2 link has more traffic flowing over it than it has bandwidth to support.
Also, we observe U = 77.4 Gbps, indicating that there are there is a total of 77.4 Gbps
more layer-2 traffic between FAPs than their bandwidth can support. Such a high value
for U would significantly degrade Internet service in the USVI. These results suggest that
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the viNGN network is unable to support peak Internet demands or that our model severely
over-estimates peak demands.
4.3 Synthetic Internet Traffic and Network Operations for
the USVI Territory
In addition to assessing traffic on STX, we consider synthetic Internet flows and operations
between islands and the mainland US. Table 4.6 presents flows between STT and STX, the
links that carry combined island flow on STX (i.e., STX Super FAP and IXP), and between
the USVI territory and CONUS (Miami and New York NAPs). While the viNGN middle
mile network serves traffic flows on STX with average demands, when combining flows
across the territory, the network becomes bandwidth limited with average demands.
All links are assumed to be 10Gbps, yet Table 4.6 shows traffic demand greater than 10Gbps
on all inter-island links. Our synthetic Internet model assigns traffic without considering
bandwidth constraints to estimate unserved demands. Thus, results where traffic exceeds
10 Gbps indicate possible bottlenecks within the USVI Internet system. In particular, the
link between the STX Super FAP and the IXP carries all Internet traffic for the territory and
is bandwidth limited with average Internet traffic, with unserved demand U = 14.7 Gbps.
Unserved demand is especially large during peak demand, with U = 120.4 Gbps, given our
assumptions about demand for viNGNs Internet services in the territory.
The STX Super FAP - IXP link has such large unserved demands because all Internet traffic
across the entire territory is routed over this single link. This limitation on the network
further emphasizes the vulnerability of the USVI Internet to a single fiber cut. Whereas
Scenario 4 above shows the entire island of STX loses Internet connectivity if a fiber run
along the STX Super FAP - IXP link is cut, Table 4.6 indicates that all customers within the
territory may lose Internet connectivity from this catastrophic scenario.
74
Table 4.6. Layer 2 Aggregate Traffic Between Islands and the Continental
United States.
Source Destination Traffic Average (Gbps) Traffic Peak (Gbps)
STT Super FAP STX Super FAP 12.1 60.7
STX Super FAP IXP 24.7 130.4
IXP Miami FAP 12.3 65.2
IXP New York FAP 12.3 65.2
Note: All layer-2 links are bidirectional (upload/download), but traffic flows are
dominated by download rates. We assume each link has a maximum bandwidth
of 10 Gbps, and we do not expect traffic across any link to exceed this value. All
demands in excess of 10 Gbps are assumed to be unserved.
4.4 Summary
Taken together, we find the STX Internet system model to be more vulnerable to infrastruc-
ture failures and demand spikes than expected. The distribution of customers across FAPs
means that the loss of key middle mile infrastructure and disconnect a large portion of the
STX population and CAIs. While the viNGN network is designed to have redundant layer-2
links and self-healing capabilities, there are also single points of failure along the layer-1
physical network that can disconnect customers. Routing of traffic between islands indi-
cates that submarine links and the link between the STX Super FAP and IXP are bandwidth
limited during average demand scenarios. Moreover, the available bandwidth at layer-2 on
STX cannot support surges in demand with or without fiber cuts.
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We conclude with a summary of our synthetic network generation results, limitations of our
model, and recommendations for future work.
5.1 Summary
This thesis completes the following data, modeling, and analysis tasks:
1. Gathered publicly available information about the USVI Internet system into geospa-
tial data sets for visualization and modeling;
2. Developed network generation techniques for producing synthetic Internet models;
3. Produced a synthetic model of the STX Internet system; and,
4. Analyzed the structure and characteristics of the STX Internet system model to
measure how it performs under different demands and disruptions.
Analysis of the STX Internet system model suggests that private Internet customers, CAIs,
and Internet demand are not evenly distributed between FAPs. Some FAPs appear to be
more essential than others based on the size of the population they support and the types
of CAIs they support. Further analysis of traffic dependencies is needed to arrive at a final
priority ranking of FAPs for infrastructure hardening and restoration after disruptions.
However, our model suggests that the viNGN network on STX has several vulnerabilities.
The most pressing are several single points of failure that, if cut, completely disconnect all
customers on STX from the Internet. Specifically, if the submarine cable landing site at
the IXP, the Super FAP, or any fiber optic cables in between these nodes are disrupted, the
network will suffer a catastrophic failure.
In the absence of a catastrophic cut, our model suggests that the viNGN network is fairly
robust to a single fiber optic cable cut. The network can re-direct Internet traffic along
alternate routes to ensure that all Internet customers remain connected to the Internet and
only experience minimal unserved demand with average traffic loads.
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5.2 Model Limitations
Development of the STX Internet systemmodel was conducted using only publicly available
information. Much of this information is over a decade old, generally incomplete, and
occasionally contradictory. Although certain features—such as the location of residential
populations andmain right-of-ways along the road system—are not believed to have change,
much of the data that we used has not been validated. Moreover, the Internet model we
assess is based on pre-hurricane infrastructure networks. Future work should build on the
data, models, and analysis presented herein to guide protection of the post-storm system.
Moreover, our analysis required a number of assumptions based on Internet use in the
mainland US that may not be appropriate for the island context. For example, average
and peak demands were based on general market trends in the US. We chose to make
this assumption, because infrastructure systems in the USVI look similar to those in the
mainland. However, systems in the USVI also have unique features that require local
knowledge to capture. We have tried to the best of our ability to capture these details
through site visits and frequent discussions. But some of this knowledge, such as network
configuration decisions, is known only by the local operators of these systems. For this
reason, we believe that the results here should be taken only as “approximately right” and
the model inputs adjusted as more data becomes available in the future.
5.3 Future Work
This analysis has considered only the system on STX, and as such it potentially misses
system properties that arise from the interconnections STT and STJ. A complete analysis of
the Internet infrastructure across the entire Territory is needed to understand the resilience of
the aggregate system. Moreover, because of the distinct differences between these islands,
a comparable analysis of the system on each island also deserves attention.
The function and performance of this model can be significantly improved through collab-
oration with local stakeholders who can validate our data and modeling assumptions. We
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